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INTRODUCTION

It is surprising that, while many courts are loathe to abolish the
doctrine of punitive damages for fear of violating legislative prerogative,' they have no perceptible qualms about emasculating the doctrine through the allowance of punitive damages insurance. To the
1. Harrell v. Travelers Indem. Co., 279 Or. 199, 216, 567 P.2d 1013, 1021 (1977)
(Limiting or abolishing punitive damages "might more appropriately be considered by the
legislature, rather than by the courts."); Templeton v. Graves, 59 Wis. 95, 98, 17 N.W. 672,
672 (1883) (citing Bass v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 42 Wis. 654 (1877), for the proposition that
abolition of punitive damages is for the legislature alone); Ghiardi, Punitive Damages in
Wisconsin, 60 MARQ. L. REV. 753, 773 (1977) (citing Bass); Comment, Insurance Coverage of
Punitive Damages in Montana, 46 MONT. L. REV. 77, 90 & n.74 (1985); see also Taylor v.
Superior Ct., 24 Cal. 3d 890, 910-11, 598 P.2d 854, 866, 157 Cal. Rptr. 693, 706 (1979) (Clark,
J., dissenting) (arguing that changes in public policy are for the legislature); Wangen v. Ford
Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d 260, 281-82, 294 N.W.2d 437, 449 (1980) (citing cases in which the
Supreme Court of Wisconsin expressly refused to abolish the doctrine of punitive damages);
Note, Insurer'sLiability for Aggravated Misconduct-PunitiveDamages, 1 WILLAMETTE L.J.
640, 653 (1961) (asserting that only legislative action can effectively resolve the insurability
dilemma); cf. MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-221(6)(b) (1985) (limiting punitive awards to the
greater of $25,000 or one percent of the defendant's net worth for cases in which the
defendant's wrongful conduct does not rise to actual fraud or actual malice). But see Harrell,
279 Or. at 225-26, 567 P.2d at 1026 (Holman, J., dissenting) (noting that the majority "paid lip
service" to eliminating the doctrine, which the court had created and therefore could eliminate
as well); cf. Tuttle v. Raymond, 494 A.2d 1353, 1361-63 (Me. 1985) (raising the burden of
persuasion necessary for an award to one of "clear and convincing evidence" and raising the
standard of conduct necessary to one of "malice," though refusing to abolish punitive
damages); Wangen, 97 Wis. at 300-01, 294 N.W.2d at 458 (raising the burden of persuasion,
though refusing to abolish the doctrine in products liability cases).
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extent that one accepts the proposition that punitive damages effectively punish and deter undesirable conduct,2 he should necessarily
conclude that allowing punitive damages insurance negates these societal benefits. Therefore, insurance of punitive damages contravenes
public policy.' Paradoxically, a growing majority of courts, 4 by
allowing insurability, has ignored or denied the plain logic of this conclusion. The trend toward insurability has manifested itself most
recently in Brown v. Maxey,5 a Supreme Court of Wisconsin decision
that yields valuable insight into the foibles and tensions underlying
the doctrine itself. This comment proposes that it is not the persuasiveness of the pro-coverage 6 arguments which has impelled these
courts to allow insurability. Rather, this phenomenon is a function
either of a fundamental judicial skepticism or even hostility to the
doctrine in its entirety,7 or of a suspicion that courts are incapable of
defining and applying a standard' of conduct for the doctrine which
will not be unfairly overbroad.9
2. See infra notes 43-44, 92, 178 and accompanying text.
3. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Village of Hempstead, 48 N.Y.2d 218, 228, 397
N.E.2d 737, 744, 422 N.Y.S.2d 47, 54 (1979); Harrell v. Travelers Indem. Co., 279 Or. 199,
220, 567 P.2d 1013, 1023 (1977) (Holman, J., dissenting); Burrell & Young, Insurability of
Punitive Damages, 62 MARQ. L. REV. 1, 24-25 (1978).
For the purposes of this comment, the word "insurability" refers to the insuring of
punitive damages liability; a "pro-coverage" court is one that allows insurability, and an "anticoverage" court is one that does not; the phrase "the doctrine" refers to the doctrine of
punitive damages; finally, "standard" or "standard of conduct" refers to conduct that
demonstrates the specified threshold level of culpability necessary to sustain a punitive
damages award.
The essence of the anti-coverage position is that the doctrine primarily benefits society by
punishing and deterring those who engage in undesirable conduct. See infra notes 43, 92, 178
and accompanying text. The argument is that when the law permits a defendant to divert his
financial penalty obligation to an insurer, in effect, the insurance shields the culpable party
from the penalty. Consequently, the doctrine neither punishes the defendant, nor is it likely to
deter future misbehavior. Northwestern Nat'l Casualty Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432 (5th Cir.
1962). See infra notes 85-101 and accompanying text.
4. Note, Insurancefor PunitiveDamages: A Reevaluation, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 431, 431-32
(1976). Ten years later, the trend still favors insurability. For a current jurisdictional
breakdown of the anti- and pro-coverage factions, see infra note 85.
5. 124 Wis. 2d 426, 369 N.W.2d 677 (1985).
6. The pro-coverage argument denies that insurability significantly reduces any of the
doctrine's societal benefits. See infra notes 102-123.
7. For a detailed analysis of the most common criticisms of the doctrine, see infra notes
40-41 and accompanying text.
8. For an explanation of the usage of this term within this comment, see supra note 3.
9. See infra notes 47-75, 119-120 and accompanying text. See also Harrell v. Travelers
Indem. Co., 279 Or. 199, 209-10, 567 P.2d 1013, 1018 (1977) (allowing insurability and
questioning the wisdom and efficiency of applying the doctrine to relatively nonculpable
conduct arising in the ordinary course of "well-established" businesses); Lazenby v. Universal
Underwriters Ins. Co., 214 Tenn. 639, 647, 383 S.W.2d 1, 5 (1964) (allowing insurability and
questioning the deterrent value of punitive damages in the drunk-driving context); Ellis,
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Despite their opposition to the doctrine, these courts perceive
themselves as unable either to do away with the doctrine entirely, or
to improve significantly the objectionable incidents of the doctrine.
Courts apparently do not regard judicial abolition as a viable alternative, 10 but rather concede that abolition of the doctrine is exclusively
within legislative prerogative. Over a century" of piecemeal legislative responses' 2 has frustrated critics favoring this solution. ConseFairnessand Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Damages, 56 S.CAL. L. REV. 1 passim (1982)
(Volume 56, number 1 of this periodical presents a symposium on punitive damages.). But cf
Harrell v. Travelers Indem. Co., 279 Or. 199, 223, 567 P.2d 1013, 1025 (1977) (Holman, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Harrell v. Ames, 265 Or. 183, 190-91, 508 P.2d 211, 215 (1973)). In
Harrell v. Ames, the Supreme Court of Oregon approved of the doctrine as a deterrent of a
particular type of reckless conduct-drunk-driving. In the second supreme court case arising
out of the same automobile accident, Harrell v. Travelers Indem. Co., the court allowed
Harrell to sue Ames's insurer for payment of Ames's punitive damages liability. The court
indicated that the doctrine's overbreadth was a key factor in its pro-coverage decision. See
Harrell, 279 Or. 199, 208-12, 218 n.22, 567 P.2d 1013, 1017-19, 1022 n.22 (1977).
10. See supra note 1.
11. Although the Supreme Court of Wisconsin regretted the creation of the doctrine as
early as 1877, it deferred to the legislature for its repeal. Bass v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., 42
Wis. 654, 672-73 (1877) (citing McWilliams v. Bragg, 3 Wis. 424 (1854), as the origin of
common law punitive damages in Wisconsin); cf Cays v. McDaniel, 204 Or. 449, 456, 283
P.2d 658, 661-62 (1955) (holding that intentionalmisrepresentation of used automobile as new
did not merit an award of punitive damages, which are "not a favorite of the law"). But cf
Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d 260, 282, 294 N.W.2d 437, 449 (1980) (stating that the
Supreme Court of Wisconsin "has extended the doctrine" (emphasis added)); infra note 78 and
accompanying text.
12. With few exceptions, existing punitive damages legislation simply fails to assuage
judicial misgivings about the doctrine's overbreadth. There exists but scant legislation
comprehensively limiting the doctrine. To the contrary, most punitive damages legislation
creates or identifies statutory causes of action for specific paradigms of misconduct, thereby
lifting such causes from the "disfavored" epithet of the common law doctrine. See infra note
11. Although statutes creating rights to double or treble damages arguably are somewhat
restrictive, these statutes generally lack a state-of-mind requirement for recovery and are,
therefore, somewhat expansive at the same time. See infra notes 150-52 and accompanying
text.
For representative state legislation creating or identifying statutory causes of action for
punitive or multiple damages, see CAL. CIV. CODE § 987 (West Supp. 1986) (allowing punitive
damages for the destruction or alteration of works of art); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 83-140 (1984)
(awarding treble damages for value of grain wrongfully and knowingly withheld from grain
purchaser); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 364.130 (Bobbs-Merril 1984) (allowing punitive damages
for entering property and cutting down timber); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, § 1012 (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1985) (allowing punitive damages in action for underpayment of wages); OKLA. STAT
ANN.. tit. 23, § 68 (1955) (allowing punitive damages for willful or grossly negligent injury to
animals).
Other statutes set forth a standard of conduct that triggers a right to punitive damages on
the part of an injured party. These often exclude actions for breach of contract. See GA.
CODE ANN. § 105-2002 [51-12-5] (Harrison Supp. 1982) (codifying the common law standard
as "aggravating circumstances, in either the act or the intention," and allowing the jury to
award additional damages for purposes of deterrence, or of compensation for "wounded
feelings"); id. § 105-2003 [51-12-6] (leaving assessment of intangible injuries entirely to the
jury's discretion, "unless the court suspects bias or prejudice from its excess or its
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quently, the sole direct option remaining within the dominion of a
critical judiciary is to redefine and limit the standard of conduct so as
to prevent the unfair or inefficient imposition of punitive awards upon
undeserving defendants.
Critical jurists also may perceive themselves as doomed to failure
because imprecise and overbroad application is a necessary concomitant of any linguistic standard; attempts to eliminate all traces of
unfairness by narrowly redefining the standard are quixotic at best.' 3
inadequacy"); id. § 20-1405 [13-6-10] (Harrison Supp. 1984) (disallowing exemplary damages
in contract, unless otherwise provided by law); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 549.20(1) (West Supp.
1986) (establishing "clear and convincing evidence" as the burden of persuasion and "wilfull
indifference to the rights or safety of others" as the standard triggering a punitive award); Id.
§ 549.20(3) (setting forth factors for measuring size of a punitive award); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 42.010 (1981) (prohibiting punitive damages in contract, but allowing them for "oppression,
fraud or malice, express or implied," or for drunk-driving resulting in injury for purposes of
punishment and deterrence); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03-07 (Supp. 1985) (allowing jury to
award punitive damages, except in contract, to punish and deter "oppression, fraud, or malice,
actual or presumed"); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 21-3-2 (1979) (same, and additionally,
allowing punitive damages for "wrongful mistreatment of animals"); see also Note, Punitive
Damages in California Under the Malice Standard: Defining Conscious Disregard, 57 S.CAL.
L. REV. 1065, 1065-67 (1984) (exploring the impact of the amended definition of "malice" on
the doctrine); cf. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294 (West Supp. 1986) (broadening the statutory
definition of "malice" necessary for a punitive award to include "conscious disregard of the
rights and safety of others," and thereby expanding the doctrine's scope).
On the other hand, some restrictive punitive damages legislation does exist. The
Delaware legislature has attempted to limit the doctrine in the context of medical malpractice
by disallowing punitive damages for unforeseen injury in the absence of actual malice. See
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 6855 (Supp. 1984). Some statutes disallow punitive damages for
specific types of conduct. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 1953 (Smith-Hurd 1980)
(disallowing punitive damages for criminal conversation, that is, adultery). The Indiana
legislature has raised the burden of persuasion needed to sustain a punitive award to one of
"clear and convincing evidence." See IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-34-2 (Burns Supp. 1985).
Another restrictive approach is to establish a monetary maximum, or "cap" for punitive
awards, which in effect limits the jury's discretion. See FLA. STAT. § 713.31 (1980) (limiting
punitive damages available for fraudulent filing of mechanics lien to the difference between the
amount fraudulently claimed and that legitimately due); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-221(6)(b)
(1985) (limiting punitive awards to the greater of $25,000 or one percent of the defendant's net
worth for cases in which the defendant's culpability falls short of actual fraud or actual
malice); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.36.080 (Supp. 1986) (allowing a civil cause of action
for malicious harrassment, including punitive damages "of up to ten thousand dollars").
Analogous to these punitive damages cap statutes are state statutes limiting compensatory
damages in medical malpractice actions. See CAL. CIv. CODE § 3333.2 (West Supp. 1986)
(limiting damages for noneconomic losses against a health care provider to two hundred fifty
thousand dollars). A California court recently refused to apply this provision to punitive
damages in Baker v. Sadick, 162 Cal. App. 3d 618, 627, 208 Cal. Rptr. 676, 682 (1984).
Interestingly, the most common type of restrictive legislation inures to the benefit of the
state. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 8105(5) (1980) (excluding punitive damages
from Maine's waiver of sovereign immunity).
See also K. REDDEN, PUNITIVE DAMAGES § 5.2 (1980 & Supp. 1985) (L. Schlueter

coauthored supplement) (jurisdictional analysis of state punitive damages law, including
statutory material).
13. In Smith v. Wade, the Supreme Court candidly articulated the common denominator
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Even if it were possible to overcome this difficulty at the definitional
level, the fact remains that the ultimate application of any punitive
damages standard often devolves upon the jury.14 Critical jurists
often voice the concern that the infamous "passion and prejudice"' 5
of the jury leads to unfair and unpredictable results in the doctrine's
application; thus, the jury's broad discretion
substantially exacerbates
16
judicial misgivings about the doctrine.
The ostensible lack of a direct remedy for the perceived shortcomings of the doctrine has prompted courts to resort to an indirect
solution-insurability.17' At first glance, insurability appears attractive: it removes the doctrine's punch 8 without violating legislative
prerogative; it eases the impact of overbroad application; and it is ecumenical in its tendency to placate critics advocating complete abolition of the doctrine as well as those insisting merely on its
limitation. 19

Under closer scrutiny, however, the unsoundness of insurability
for terminology denoting punitive damages standards: "The focus is on the character of the
tortfeasor's conduct-whether it is of the sort that calls for deterrence and punishment ......
461 U.S. 30, 54 (1983). Whatever the standard, there will exist conduct which some would
urge "called for deterrence and punishment," while others who disagreed would term the
application of the doctrine to such conduct "unfairly overbroad."
The problem stems from the attempt to divide culpability into discrete strata; some degree
of overlapping, and thus, unfairness is unavoidable inasmuch as culpability exists along a
continuum. The search for "foolproof" classifications and standards is illusory. See infra notes
47-66 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 67-75 and accompanying text.
15. Mallor & Roberts, Punitive Damages: Toward a PrincipledApproach, 31 HASTINGS L.
J. 639, 646 (1980); infra notes 70, 72 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 70-75 and accompanying text.
17. See Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Village of Hempstead, 48 N.Y.2d 218, 228,
397 N.E.2d 737, 744, 422 N.Y.S.2d 47, 54 (1979) (observing that pro-coverage arguments are
essentially arguments against the doctrine, and that by allowing insurability, courts "totally
...defeat the purpose of punitive damages..."); Harrell v. Travelers Indem. Co., 279 Or. 199,
220, 567 P.2d 1013, 1026 (1977) (Holman, J., dissenting) (noting that the majority had at its
disposal better solutions than insurability).
18. Courts, however, do not allow one to insure against liability arising from his own
intentional torts. Haser v. Maryland Casualty Co., 78 N.D. 893, 53 N.W.2d 508 (1952).
Analogously, one may not seek indemnification for criminal fines. See cases cited infra note 80.
19. Insurability seemingly moots all but one of the primary criticisms of the doctrine,
namely, that the doctrine provides an unnecessary windfall to plaintiffs. Smith v. Wade, 461
U.S. 30, 59 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See infra note 40 and accompanying text. Thus,
insurability does not placate critics who complain only on this basis. The doctrine's
proponents, however, categorize the windfall aspect as a benefit inasmuch as it encourages
plaintiffs to bring to justice wrongdoers who otherwise would escape all punishment.
Similarly, not all critics favoring the doctrine's limitation (as opposed to its abolition) will
accept insurability. Insurability tacitly excuses all conduct less culpable than intentional
misconduct, and therefore, some degree of under-application necessarily results. Insurability
will placate these critics only to the extent that they consider the doctrine's over-application to
be of worse consequence than its under-application.
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comes into focus. It does more than merely counteract what critics
view as the doctrine's most objectionable shortcoming, overbreadth:
insurability frustrates the doctrine's primary benefits while retaining
and even exacerbating certain of the doctrine's shortcomings. 20 That
a pro-coverage advocate defends the wisdom of this trade-off is evidence that he has determined that what he considers to be the primary shortcomings of the doctrine outweigh its primary benefits.
Under analysis, the essence of such an evaluation is but an argument
for abolition of the doctrine. 2 ' Because courts perceive themselves to
be at the mercy of legislatures which tend to ignore the doctrine,2 2
they are forced to turn to an indirect and inexpedient means of abolition which is fraught with drawbacks.
To understand better how the doctrine's infirmities culminate in
insurability, it is instructive to look to the evolution of punitive dam24
ages in Wisconsin. 23 The authors of a well-reasoned 1978 article
20. Insurability removes the primary benefits of the doctrine-punishment and deterrence.
Northwestern Nat'l Casualty Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1962). For a detailed
presentation of this anti-coverage argument, see infra notes 85-101 and accompanying text.
Additionally, pro-coverage advocates may argue that other benefits of the doctrine remain
despite insurability. They argue that the doctrine complements an often insufficient
compensatory damages award, and thus serves a quasi-compensatory function; it encourages
reluctant plaintiffs to prosecute those crimes that the overburdened criminal justice system
simply cannot (often referred to as the "private attorney general" theory); finally, it serves to
discourage private (and often violent) retribution by providing plaintiffs with an enhanced
sense of vindication. See infra notes 44-45, 150-53 and accompanying text. For a general
analysis of the pro-coverage position, see infra notes 102-139 and accompanying text.
However valid these alternate rationales may be, the fact remains that insurability
frustrates what most jurisdictions consider the doctrine's primary purposes-punishment and
deterrence. See infra notes 43, 92, 178 and accompanying text. But cf. infra note 45 and
accompanying text (arguing that insurability is reasonable when implementing the doctrine
primarily for rationales other than punishment and deterrence).
Moreover, to the extent that the doctrine provides unjustifiable windfalls, insurability
magnifies this negative aspect by assuring an ever-present "deep pocket" for the plaintiff.
Although this may encourage legitimate claims, it invites illegitimate claims as well. Insurers
will pass the cost of punitive damages judgments back to the public by means of increased
premiums. Thus, insurability not only relieves the actual wrongdoer of his punishment, but it
may shift the punishment to society as a whole. Northwestern Nat'l Casualty Co. v. McNulty,
307 F.2d 432, 440-41 (5th Cir. 1962). See infra text accompanying notes 99-100. Moreover,
insurability better enables a potential tortfeasor to appraise the costs of his conduct in advance
and thus facilitates a "cost-benefit" analysis whereby the tortfeasor may determine that
misconduct is a financially sound course of action. Therefore, insurability may have the
unfortunate effect of encouraging undesirable behavior. See infra notes 200-02 and
accompanying text.
21. Burrell & Young, supra note 3, at 32-33. See supra note 17.
22. See supra note 11. For a sampling of legislative treatment of the doctrine, see supra
note 12 and accompanying text.
23. For a detailed description and history of the doctrine in Wisconsin, see K. REDDEN,
supra note 12, at § 5.2(A)(49); Burrell & Young, supra note 3, at 4-7; Ghiardi, supra note 1, at
753; Ghiardi & Koehn, Punitive Damages in Strict Liability Cases, 61 MARQ. L. REV. 245,
245-49 (1977-1978); Hartman, Exemplary Damages a Deformity in Our Law, 2 MARQ. L.
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predicted that Wisconsin courts would not allow insurability 25 based

upon the authors' analysis of Wisconsin's punitive damages law and
upon their perceptive distillation of the insurability controversy.
Because their prediction recently proved incorrect in Brown v.
Maxey,2 6 their analysis becomes of special interest. Their prediction
began with the axiom that Wisconsin sanctions punitive damages primarily to punish and deter undesirable conduct.27 Next, the authors
reasoned that insurability would defeat the punitive and deterrent
benefits of the doctrine and, therefore, would be contrary to public
policy. 28 The authors observed that, despite these public policy con-

cerns, courts tend to allow insurability when they deem the standard
to be too broad; that is, the "over-availability" of punitive damages is
the pivotal consideration motivating pro-coverage courts. 29 The
authors confidently proposed that the Wisconsin standard was an
extremely narrow one, namely "intent," and, therefore, precluded
assessment of punitive awards against "undeserving" defendants.3"
Consequently, they predicted that, when the issue arose, Wisconsin
courts would perceive no need to allow insurability.3"
Significantly, however, the authors failed to make an accurate
prediction not because of defective reasoning, but rather because they
failed to anticipate the effects of the Wisconsin Supreme Court's fickle
treatment of the doctrine. Before Brown, one reasonably could have
inferred that the then current case law prescribed "intent" as the standard,3 2 although it would have been impossible to articulate the WisREV. 57passim (1917-1918); Walther & Plein, Punitive Damages: A CriticalAnalysis: Kink v.
Combs, 49 MARQ. L. REV. 369 passim (1965-1966); Wickhem, The Rule of Exemplary
Damages in Wisconsin, 2 Wis. L. REV. 129 passim (1923); supra notes 124-41 and
accompanying text.
24. Burrell & Young, supra note 3, reprintedin K. REDDEN, PUNITIVE DAMAGES §§ 9.1-

9.6 (1980).
25. Id. at 32-33.
26. 124 Wis. 2d 426, 369 N.W.2d 677 (1985).
27. Id. at 5 n. 11 & 33. See also infra notes 43, 92, 178 (most jurisdictions approve of the
doctrine for purposes of punishment and deterrence). But see infra note 44 (remarking that a
few states employ the doctrine chiefly for compensatory purposes).
28. See Burrell & Young, supra note 3, at 24-25.
29. Id. at 25-33.
30. Id. at 6 n.19 (citing Bielski v. Schulze, 16 Wis. 2d 1, 114 N.W.2d 105 (1962)). For a
detailed analysis of the Wisconsin standard's uncertain and, perhaps, unfortunate
metamorphosis, see supra note 135 and accompanying text.
31. Burrell & Young, supra note 3, at 32-33.
The authors predicted that if Wisconsin law in fact restricted punitive damages to
intentional torts, the court would not allow insurability. Implicitly acknowledging the
unstable status of the Wisconsin standard, the authors proposed, alternatively, that in the
event the doctrine was applicable to non-intentional torts, the courts should not allow
insurability. Id. at 33.
32. See supra note 30; see also Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d 260, 294 N.W.2d
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consin standard with comfortable certainty.3 3 In fact, the supreme
court's undeniably inconsistent treatment of the doctrine reveals that
the court itself was unable to fix the standard.3 4 The only possible
consistent interpretation of the supreme court's standard is that sometimes-but not always-punitive damages should be available for conduct less culpable than intentional misconduct. 35 Before deciding the
insurability issue in Brown, the court had to harmonize its inconsistent precedent 36 and commit itself to a definitive standard-either

intent, which would be at times too narrow, or "less-than-intent,"
which would be at times too broad.3 7 Because the court opted for the
latter, the consequent possibility of unfair application became a material concern to the court, and insurance became the solution. Had the
authors applied their test to this scenario, they might have correctly
predicted the result in Brown, although they certainly would not have
sanctioned it. 38 The Supreme Court of Wisconsin resorted to insura437 (1980) (establishing an expansive, open-ended punitive damages standard-"outrageous"
conduct); Cieslewicz v. Mutual Serv. Casualty Ins. Co., 84 Wis. 2d 91, 267 N.W.2d 595 (1978)
(assessing as unresolved the question of punitive damages in cases of negligence); Bielski v.
Schulze, 16 Wis. 2d 1, 114 N.W.2d 105 (1962) (purporting to eliminate the availability of
punitive damages for conduct less culpable than intentional misconduct). Although the
Supreme Court of Wisconsin had not decided Wangen by the time commentators Burrell and
Young had authored their article, it had decided Cieslewicz. The authors were aware of the
potential conflict between Bielski and Cieslewicz, but seemed confident that Bielski would
prevail. See Burrell & Young, supra note 3, at 7.
33. Wangen appears to have been an attempt on the part of the Supreme Court of
Wisconsin to harmonize its precedent and to establish a definitive standard of conduct for
punitive damages. See supra note 30. It appears, however, that even in the wake of Wangen,
the standard was subject to divergent interpretations. Brown v. Maxey, No. 83-2325, slip op. at
21 (Wis. Ct. App. Oct. 25, 1984) (noting that "[Wangen] may be sending mixed messages to
the trial bench"), rev'd, 124 Wis. 2d 426, 369 N.W.2d 677 (1985). See infra notes 172-76 and
accompanying text.
34. Discord within the bench further frustrated the process of selecting a definitive
standard. Compare Bielski v. Schulze, 16 Wis. 2d 1, 114 N.W.2d 105 (1962) (abolishing
punitive damages in negligence context) with Cieslewicz v. Mutual Serv. Casualty Ins. Co., 84
Wis. 2d 91, 267 N.W.2d 595 (1978) (contending that Bielski left open the question of whether
punitive damages were available in negligence) and Wangen v. Ford, 97 Wis. 2d 260, 294
N.W.2d 437 (1980) (holding that punitive damages are appropriate for outrageous behavior
regardless of the characterization of the underlying tort).
35. If the court viewed narrowing the standard as a viable solution, it could have done just
that in Brown because that very issue was before the court. Brown, 124 Wis. 2d at 429, 369
N.W.2d at 679. That it did not do so may indicate a belief that this solution was either
impracticable or undesirable.
36. Brown v. Maxey, No. 83-2325, slip op. at 23 (Wis. Ct. App. Oct. 25, 1984) ("If as a
matter of policy, enlargement of the punitive damages rule is thought to be necessary, such a
decision is solely within the sphere of the supreme court."), rev'd, 124 Wis. 2d 426, 369 N.W.2d
677 (1985). See supra notes 30, 33. But cf.Harrell v. Travelers Indem. Co., 279 Or. 199, 216,
567 P.2d 1013, 1021 (1977) (suggesting that even restricting the doctrine might be a task for
the legislature).
37. See supra note 19.
38. Burrell & Young, supra note 3, at 33.
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bility to temper the doctrine's overbreadth although it had arguably
better alternatives at its disposal. This comment examines the tensions underlying the doctrine of punitive damages and demonstrates
that it is these tensions which ultimately prompt courts to make the
pro-coverage choice.

II.

PERSPECTIVE: PUNITIVE DAMAGES

A basic introduction to the doctrine of punitive damages is a prerequisite to a full understanding of the insurability issue. From its
inception, the doctrine has been the subject of controversy. 39 Jurists
have differed as to the doctrine's propriety," scope,4 ' and even its
purpose. Because of this longstanding controversy, the doctrine's status is ill-defined and uncertain in some jurisdictions.
39. A detailed history and review of punitive damages is beyond the scope of this note.
For authorities presenting theoretical and historical overviews of the doctrine, see Smith v.
Wade, 461 U.S. 30 (1983); Tuttle v. Raymond, 494 A.2d 1353 (Me. 1985); Wangen v. Ford
Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d 260, 294 N.W.2d 437 (1980); J. GHIARDI & J. KIRCHER, PUNITIVE
DAMAGES LAW AND PRACTICE (1984);

C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF

DAMAGES §§ 77-85 (1935); K. REDDEN, supra note 23, at §§ 2.1-2.9; id. at 45-46 (for a
bibliography of legal periodicals on the subject); Belli, Punitive Damages: Their History, Their
Use and Their Worth in Present-DaySociety, 49 UMKC L. REV. 1 (1980); Ellis, supra note 9,
at 3-20; Long, Punitive Damages: An Unsettled Doctrine, 25 DRAKE L. REV. 870, 890-92
(1975-1976) (presenting an extensive bibliography on the doctrine); Mallor & Roberts, supra
note 15, at 642-50; Morris, Punitive Damages in Tort Cases, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1173 (1931);
Note, Exemplary Damages in the Law of Torts, 70 HARV. L. REV. 517 (1957); see also supra
note 23 (listing authorities on the doctrine within Wisconsin).
40. Every state recognizes common law punitive damages except Louisiana,
Massachusetts, Nebraska, and Washington. See Vincent v. Morgan's La. & T.R. & S.S. Co.,
140 La. 1027, 74 So. 541 (1917); City of Lowell v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 313
Mass. 257, 47 N.E.2d 265 (1943); Wilfong v. Omaha & Council Bluffs St. Ry., 129 Neb. 600,
262 N.W. 537 (1935); Spokane Truck & Dray Co. v. Hoefer, 2 Wash. 45, 25 P. 1072 (1891); H.
OLECK, DAMAGES TO PERSONS AND PROPERTY § 269 (1961); see also Smith v. Wade, 461
U.S. 30, 58-60 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citing cases from jurisdictions rejecting the
doctrine). Courts, however, have levied caustic criticism against punitive damages even in
jurisdictions "approving" of the doctrine: "The idea is wrong. It is a monstrous heresy. It is
an unsightly and unhealthy excrescense, deforming the symmetry of the body of the law." Fay
v. Parker, 53 N.H. 343, 382 (1873); see Smith, 461 U.S. at 56 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting);
Harrell v. Travelers Indem. Co., 279 Or. 199, 216, 567 P.2d 1013, 1021 (1977); supra notes 17
& 20; see also Tuttle v. Raymond, 494 A.2d 1353, 1355 n.3 (1985) (citing cases critical of the
doctrine); Carsey, The Case Against Punitive Damages, I1 FORUM 57 (1976) (criticizing the
doctrine and its continued use). But see Note, A Recklessness StandardforPunitive Damages
in Section 1983 Actions, 49 Mo. L. REV. 817, 819 n.25 (1984) (citing authorities defending the
doctrine); Note, In Defense of Punitive Damages, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 303, 304-06 (1980)
(same).
41. Once a court accepts the propriety of punitive damages as a doctrine, the next inquiry
necessarily involves determining when such awards are proper. This leads to two areas of
dispute: (a) denominating the particular "type" of conduct for which an award of punitive
damages is proper, that is, the "standard," and, (b) deciding whether an existing denomination
actually encompasses, or should encompass, a particular example of conduct such that
punitive damages would be proper.
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Notwithstanding this debate, the vast majority of American
jurisdictions implement the doctrine primarily for the purposes of
punishment and deterrence. 42 A few jurisdictions view the doctrine as
having additional or different rationales,4 3 such as compensation or a
''spur to litigation." The doctrine's asserted purpose bears directly
upon the insurability issue: courts that do not assert punishment and
deterrence as the bases of the doctrine are less inclined to force a
defendant to pay a punitive award out of his own pocket. For these
courts, it is crucial that the plaintiff receive the award, whether from
the defendant, or from the defendant's insurer."4
42. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(1) (1979) ("Punitive damages are . . .
awarded against a person to punish him for his outrageous conduct and to deter him and
others like him from similar conduct in the future."); see Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 46-47
(1983) (citing with approval RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 (1979)); id. at 54
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Brown v. Maxey, 124 Wis. 2d 426, 433, 369 N.W.2d 677, 681
(1985); Ellis, supra note 9, at 4-10; Morris, supra note 39, at 1185-88; Note, supra note 39, at
522-25. But see Harris v. County of Racine, 512 F. Supp. 1273, 1282-83 (E.D. Wis. 1981)
(contending that despite Wisconsin's traditional view of punitive damages, civil rights actions
impart a compensatory function to the doctrine).
43. A few jurisdictions treat punitive damages as being compensatory in nature:
Connecticut, Iowa, Michigan, and New Hampshire. In these jurisdictions, the doctrine
functions to compensate plaintiffs either for intangible injuries for which traditional causes of
action provide insufficient redress, or for attorneys fees and other expenses of litigation. See
Tedesco v. Maryland Casualty Co., 127 Conn. 533, 18 A.2d 357 (1941); Brause v. Brause, 190
Iowa 329, 177 N.W. 65 (1920); Wise v. Daniel, 221 Mich. 229, 190 N.W. 746 (1922); Fay v.
Parker, 53 N.H. 343, 382 (1873); Note, supra note 39, at 520-21 & n.32 (1956-1957); see also
GA. CODE ANN. § 105-2002 [51-12-5] (Harrison 1984) (allowing the jury to award additional
damages for purposes of deterrence, or of compensation for "wounded" feelings).
Courts have set forth two additional rationales for punitive damages: (a) revenge
(Gostowski v. Roman Catholic Church of the Sacred Hearts, 262 N.Y. 320, 324-25, 186 N.E.
798, 800 (1933)) and (b) incentive for plaintiffs to bring actions to justice which promise little
in way of compensatory damages (the "private attorney-general" or the spur-to-litigation
function) (Abbie Uriguen Oldsmobile Buick, Inc. v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 95 Idaho 501,
511 P.2d 783, 791 (1983) (Donaldson, C.J., concurring); Walker v. Sheldon, 10 N.Y.2d 401,
179 N.E.2d 497 (1961); Kink v. Combs, 28 Wis. 2d 65, 80, 135 N.W.2d 789, 798 (1965)).
44. Jurisdictions which view punitive awards as wholly or partly compensatory will tend
to allow insurability more readily than jurisdictions which take a traditional view. "The
rationale of compensatory damages is not so much a policy that the responsible party should
pay; it is more a policy that the wholly innocent party should not pay. Insurance against
compensatory liability therefore does not frustrate the reason for imposing the liability."
Northwestern Nat'l Casualty Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432, 438 (5th Cir. 1962). The court
distinguished several cases allowing insurance on the ground that punitive damages serve a
compensatory function for the particular jurisdictions with respect to the particular cause of
action. Id. at 438-39. See also Wojciak v. Northern Package Corp., 310 N.W.2d 675 (Minn.
1981) (punitive damages distinguished from multiple statutory damages on ground that the
latter are awarded for less-culpable conduct than are the former, and have a rationale beyond
punishment and deterrence; therefore, public policy prohibits insurance only of the former);
Cieslewicz v. Mutual Serv. Casualty Ins. Co., 84 Wis. 2d 91, 267 N.W.2d 595 (1978) (same);
Burrell & Young, supra note 3, at 33; cf. Fagot v. Ciravola, 445 F. Supp. 342 (E.D. La. 1978)
(allowing insurability because of compensatory aspect of punitive damages in § 1983 litigation
and noting that Louisiana does not approve of civil damages for a purely punitive purpose);
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The scope of the doctrine has had an even more profound impact
on the insurability analysis. As a predicate for a punitive damages
award, courts insist that a defendant possess a certain minimum standard of culpable conduct. The predicate has been anything but standard. Courts have fostered confusion by adopting an overgenerous
assortment of incongruous standards demarcating the requisite con-

duct.45 Further, even when jurists concur as to terminology, they
often diverge as to the quantum of culpability which the term contemplates.4 6 Because of this incongruity, there can be no unanimity
Harris v. County of Racine, 512 F. Supp. 1273, 1284 (E.D. Wis. 1981) (allowing insurability
of punitive damages under § 1983). But cf. Soderbeck v. Burnett County, 752 F.2d 285, 291
(7th Cir. 1985) (upholding the judge's right not to submit the punitive damages issue to the
jury in a § 1983 action unless convinced that the defendant had recognized the wrongfulness of
his act at the time of its commission).
Similarly, although many courts treat the goals of punishment and deterrence as mutually
inclusive, some authorities question the deterrent effect of the doctrine and contend that
punishment remains the only realizable goal. These courts, apparently of the mind that the
scope of conduct which ought be punished is narrower than that which ought be deterred, tend
to allow insurability to neutralize the overbroad application of an essentially punitive sanction.
First Bank (N.A.)-Billings v. Transamerica Ins. Co., - Mont. - , 679 P.2d 1217 (1984);
Lazenby v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 18 Tenn. 639, 383 S.W.2d 1 (1964); Sinclair Oil
Corp. v. Columbia Casualty Co., 682 P.2d 975, 981 (Wyo. 1984). But cf Ellis, supra note 9, at
11 (punishment and deterrence are the only viable goals).
45. Society assumes that different examples of undesirable conduct exhibit varying degrees
of "fault" and accordingly merit different degrees of punishment. See Smith v. Wade, 461
U.S. 30, 56 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
The need to treat varying "types" of conduct differently generates a search for appropriate
terminology. This confounds matters: "The courts are constantly confused and frustrated by
the over-generous employment of adjectives in describing wrongful conduct, and the difficulty
becomes well-nigh insurmountable when the attempt must be made to draw the line which
marks the boundaries of different kinds of liability." Harrell v. Travelers Indem. Co., 279 Or.
199, 212 n.14, 567 P.2d 1013, 1019 n.14 (1977) (quoting Cook v. Kinzua Pine Mills Co., 207
Or. 34, 58, 293 P.2d 717, 728 (1956)); see also Ellis, supra note 9, at 52-53; Owen, Punitive
Damages in Products Liability Litigation, 74 MICH. L. REV. 1257, 1283 & n.135 (1976); Note,
Those Weasel Words-"Wilful and Wanton," 92 U. PA. L. REV. 431 (1944). For ample
testimony as to the chaotic state of predicate conduct terminology, see Smith v. Wade, 461
U.S. 30 (1983).
46. Writing for the Supreme Court in Steamboat New World v. King, Justice Curtis
recognized the inherent difficulty in defining and applying classifications of culpability:
The theory that there are three degrees of negligence, described by the terms
light, ordinary, and gross, has been introduced into the common law from some
of the commentators on the Roman law. It may be doubted if these terms can be
usefully applied in practice. Their meaning is not fixed, or capable of being so.
One degree thus described not only may be confounded with another, but it is
quite impracticable to distinguish them. Their signification necessarily varies
according to circumstances to whose influence the courts have been forced to
yield, until there are so many real exceptions, that the rules themselves can
scarcely be said to have a general operation. If the law furnishes no definition of
the terms ... which can be applied in practice, but leaves [such determinations]
to the jury . . . . it would seem that imperfect and confessedly unsuccessful
[attempted definitions] ... had better be abandoned.
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among courts in their selection of a single standard; some degree of
disapproval is unavoidable. Even when judges accept the doctrine in
principle, they often question the fairness and wisdom of its widening
application. 47 The inconsistent and arguably overbroad application
of the doctrine may be the key to untying the "Gordian Knot"4
which the insurability issue presents: courts that allow insurability
have restricted indirectly the doctrine's overbreadth, thus obviating
the need to abrogate entirely or to limit explicitly this longstanding
doctrine's triggering standard. Untying this "knot," then, demands
an examination of the ill-fated search for the ideal punitive damages
standard.4 9
57 U.S. 469, 473-74 (16 How. 1853). Of the three degrees of negligence, gross negligence
remains viable in many jurisdictions today.
47. First Bank (N.A.)-Billings v. Transamerica Ins. Co., - Mont -, -, 679 P.2d 1217,
1222 (1984). While many jurisdictions earlier had required a showing of actual malice for an
imposition of punitive damages, the desire to punish and deter certain types of conduct led to a
broadening of the "test" for malice, and hence, for determining the propriety of an award. See
Taylor v. Superior Court, 24 Cal. 3d 890, 899, 598 P.2d 854, 859, 157 Cal. Rptr. 693, 698
(1979) ("Drunken drivers are extremely dangerous people."); Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co.,
119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 808-10, 174 Cal. Rptr. 348, 381-83 (1981); G.D. Searle & Co. v.
Superior Court, 49 Cal. App. 3d 22, 31-32, 122 Cal. Rptr. 218, 225 (1975) (suggesting
"conscious disregard" as a replacement test for "actual malice" in products liability context);
Harrell v. Ames, 265 Or. 183, 189-91, 508 P.2d 211, 214-15 (1973) (proposing that drunkdriving is sufficiently culpable conduct to merit the doctrine's deterrent effect); Wangen v.
Ford Motor Co, 97 Wis. 2d 260, 271, 294 N.W.2d 437, 444 (1980) (allowing punitive damages
for less than actual malice in the products liability context); Owen, supra note 46, at 1283 &
n.135; Schuster, Punitive Damages in Strict Products Liability Litigation: the Doctrine, the
Debate, the Defenses, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 771 (1981); Comment, Punitive Damages and the
Drunken Driver, 8 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 117 (1980); Comment, Malice in Wonderland: Taylor
v. Superior Court, 8 SAN FERN. V.L. REV. 219 (1980); Note, Punitive Damages for
Nondeliberate Torts-The Drunken Driving Context, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 911 (1980); Note, Tort
Damages-PunitiveDamagesProperlyAwarded Against Intoxicated Drivers, 20 SANTA CLARA
L. REV. 1013 (1980).
What the law giveth, however, the law taketh away. This broadened scope has elicited
responses limiting the applicability or strength of the doctrine, such as insurability and stricter
burdens of proof for awards. See Tuttle v. Raymond, 494 A.2d 1353 (Me. 1985); Harrell v.
Travelers Indem. Co., 279 Or. 199, 216-17, 567 P.2d 1013, 1021 (1979); Wangen v. Ford
Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d 260, 299, 294 N.W.2d 437, 457 (1980).
48. A commentator defined "Gordian knot":
The Gordian Knot in antiquity, [was] a knot in the leather or harness of Gordius,
a king of Phrygia, so very intricate that there was no finding where it began or
ended. An oracle declared that he who should untie this knot should be master
of Asia. Alexander, fearing that his inability to untie it should prove an ill
augury, cut it asunder with his sword. Hence, in modern language, a Gordian
knot is an inextricable difficulty; and to cut the Gordian knot, is to remove a
difficulty by bold or unusual measures.
Comment, supra note 1, at 86 n.57 (quoting from AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1904)). See First Bank (N.A.)- Billings v. Transamerica Ins. Co., - Mont
, 679 P.2d 1217, 1223 (1984); Comment, supra note 1, at 86 n.57, 88 nn.65-66.
49. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
In order to conduct a meaningful inquiry as to whether insurability contravenes public
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Such an ideal standard cannot exist. The problem arises from
the attempt to impose concrete classifications upon something as
abstract as culpability: it seems more equitable to impose punitive
damages for conduct because it satisfies a "wanton and willful" standard, for example, than simply because it seems "intuitively wrong."
It offends one's sense of rational justice to acknowledge reliance on so
subjective a standard. 0 Nevertheless, attempts to measure culpability
necessarily rest on an examination of the defendant's subjective state
of mind." It is out of devotion to objectivity that courts attempt to
stratify states of mind into discrete levels of culpability. 2
Insistance upon discrete objective standards may be unrealistic
and impracticable; the distinctions often dissolve upon application.
The Second Restatement of Torts divides culpable states of mind into
three strata: intent,5 3 recklessness,5 4 and negligence.5

5

Each of these

policy, it will be necessary initially to assume that punitive awards serve a "rational policy."
Tuttle v. Raymond, 494 A.2d 1353, 1360 (Me. 1985). Otherwise, there would be no public
policy for insurance to contravene in the first place.
See Harrell v. Travelers Indem. Co., 279 Or. 199, 218, 567 P.2d 1013, 1022 & n.22 (1977)
(referring to the doctrine's overbreadth in justifying insurability); Burrell & Young, supra note
3, at 23, 29-31 (1978) (noting the tendency of courts to use insurability to compensate for the
doctrine's overbreadth).
50. Taylor v. Superior Court, 24 Cal. 3d 890, 902-03, 598 P.2d 854, 861, 157 Cal. Rptr.
693, 700-01 (1979) (Clark, J., dissenting) (lack of effective punitive damages guidelines allows a
jury to award at "whim"); Ellis, supra note 9, at 40 & n.174 (indicating that punitive damages
standards are unfair in their failure to provide individuals with sufficient notice as to what
conduct will be punished); Givelber, The Right to Minimum Social Decency and the Limits of
Evenhandedness.- Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress by Outrageous Conduct, 82
COLUM. L. REV. 42, 51-53 nn.49-59 (1982) (suggesting that the "outrageous" standard of the
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965) so lacks objective guidelines as to violate due
process for vagueness); cf. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S 30, 88 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
("elastic" recklessness standard gives "free reign to the biases and prejudices of juries"); infra
notes 67-75 and accompanying text (relating the role of the jury to judicial misgivings about
the doctrine). But see Tuttle v. Raymond, 494 A.2d 1353, 1359 (Me. 1985) (arguing that the
lack of an objective standard for determining the size of an award does not invite abuse); cf.
Soderbeck v. Burnett County, 752 F.2d 285, 291 (7th Cir. 1985) (upholding the court's
decision not to submit the issue to the jury); Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d 260, 298,
294 N.W.2d 437, 457 (1980) (noting that the court need not submit the issue of punitive
damages to the jury unless the evidence is sufficient for a finding of "outrageousness").
51. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 71 n.7, 87-88 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Of
course, any inquiry into the subjective state of mind will be subjective in and of itself. This
reality lies at the foundation of the oft-voiced concern that two different juries viewing the
same set of facts could decide the punitive damage issue differently. See First Bank (N.A.)Billings v. Transamerica Ins. Co., - Mont.
,
, 679 P.2d 1217, 1223 (1984) (citing
additional cases); infra notes 69-72.
52. As stated previously, courts have been overgenerous in the provision of applicable
terminology: denominations include intent (actual and constructive), malice (actual and
implied), recklessness, wanton/willfulness, insult, oppression, contumely, conscious
indifference-the list continues. For purposes of simplicity, this discussion will focus on the
"three-tiered" Restatement approach to culpability. See infra notes 54-56.
53. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (1965): "The word 'intent' is used
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strata subjects an actor to a different degree of liability. In practice,
however, these three standards are not distinct at all, but rather shade
into one another to comprise a continuum of culpability. A single act
may subject an actor to any of the three levels of liability for the consequences of his act. The determinative factors are the extent of the
risk of harm5 6 and the actor's knowledge5 7 of the extent of the risk.
throughout the Restatement of this Subject to denote that the actor desires to cause the
consequences of his act, or that he believes that the consequences are substantially certain to
result from it." One must note that "intent" refers only to the consequences of the act: not to
the act itself. Id. comment a. An act must be "volitional" for an actor to be "subject to
liability." Id. § 2 comment a (1965).
54. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 500 (1965).
The actor's conduct is in reckless disregard of the safety of another if he ...[acts]
knowing or having reason to know of facts which would lead a reasonable man to
realize, not only that his conduct creates an unreasonable risk of physical harm
to another but also that such risk is substantially greater than that which is
necessary to make his conduct negligent.
Id. Comment f of this section distinguishes intent from recklessness: the former demands
knowledge to a "substantial certainty," while the latter requires the less stringent "strong
probability." Id. comment f. Further, section 8A, defining intent, requires that the actor
"believe" that there is substantial certainty of harm, whereas for recklessness the actor need
not actually realize the strong probability of harm so long as he has information from which a
reasonable person could infer such a probability. Id. §§ 8(A), 12(1), & 500 comment c (1965).
55. Negligence is seemingly more elusive than "intent" or "recklessness"; accordingly,
numerous Restatement (Second) provisions apply. For the purposes of this discussion, it is
sufficient to distinguish "negligence" from the next-higher degree of culpability,
"recklessness." Section 500 of the Restatement (Second) implies that, although both involve
conduct which presents an "unreasonable risk" of harm to another, recklessness entails an
unreasonable risk that reaches a "strong probability" of harm, whereas negligence
encompasses an unreasonable risk of less than a strong probability of harm. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 282 comment e (1965); supra note 34.
It is also noteworthy that for negligence a tortfeasor is held, at minimum, to the risk of
harm that a reasonable person would have perceived under the circumstances (§§ 289-290) in
determining whether the conduct was negligent in presenting an "unreasonable" risk (§§ 291296). In contrast, recklessness involves, at minimum, a subjective inquiry as to the actor's
having information (reason to know) from which a reasonable person would realize the strong
probability of harm. Id. § 500 comment b (1965).
56. The Restatement (Second) provides in part:
Intent is not, however, limited to consequences which are desired. If the actor
knows that the consequences are certain, or substantially certain, to result from
his act, and still goes ahead, he is treated by the law as if he had in fact desired to
produce the result. As the probability that the consequences will follow
decreases, and becomes less than [a] substantial certainty, the actor's conduct
loses the character of intent, and becomes mere recklessness, as defined in § 500.
As the probability decreases further, and amounts only to a risk that the result
will follow, it becomes ordinary negligence, as defined in § 282. All three have
their important place in the law of torts, but the liability attached to them will
differ.
Id. § 8A comment b (1965).
57. In recklessness, constructive knowledge arguably may satisfy the knowledge
requirement; that is, a jury also may find an actor reckless if he had "reason to know of facts
which would lead a reasonable man to realize" the extent of the risk of unreasonable harm. Id.
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Thus, an actor who believes that particular consequences are "substantially certain" to result from his act is held to the highest level of
culpability, that of intent, whereas knowledge of a "strong
probability" subjects the actor to a lower level of culpability, recklessness. Similarly, as the probability of harm decreases further, the conduct approaches the lowest level of culpability, negligence.
This approach presents difficulty when an actor's state of mind
falls into a "gray area""8 of culpability. As an illustration, suppose
that an actor is driving briskly along a narrow road through a wooded
area. He admits that he knew that he was approaching a bend in the
road, and that an elementary school was located along the bend; no
other homes or establishments are in the vicinity. Nevertheless, as he
rounds the bend, he strikes a child whom he is unable to see standing
at the roadside. In order to assess the probability or risk that harm
would result from this conduct, it is essential to consider the time
element. If the act occurred at 3:00 p.m., a jury could readily find
that the actor was substantially certain that children would be near
the roadside and in his path. Thus, a jury might hold the actor to the
highest level of culpability-intent. An analysis of the same events,
but set at 3:05, would probably point to the same conclusion; however, as the time frame continues to shift, the likelihood of the child's
presence will lessen. Eventually, perhaps at 8:00 p.m. or at 3:00 a.m.,
a jury might find that the risk of harm was less than a "strong
probability," subjecting the actor to the lowest level of culpabilitynegligence, or, perhaps, to no culpability at all. Obviously, at numerous, if not at most, points in time, the probability of harm, and thus
the actor's culpability, would be subject to dispute: when does an
"unreasonable risk" become a "strong probability" of harm? Because
culpability does not make a quantum leap from one stratum to the
next, a somewhat uncertain inquiry becomes necessary. The potential
for interpretational dispute and linguistic gymnastics is enormous,
§ 500 (1965) (emphasis added). Despite the italicized language, however, it is unlikely that the
drafters of the Restatement intended for recklessness to encompass a duty to investigate. The
Restatement defines "reason to know" to mean that "the actor has information from which a

person of reasonable intelligence ...would infer that the fact in question exists ....
" Id. § 12
(emphasis added). If one reads these Restatement definitions together, it seems that
recklessness would require either actual knowledge of a strong probability of harm, or
knowledge of facts which would lead a reasonable person to perceive this probability, but it
would not impose a duty to discover such facts. In contrast, in assessing negligence, a jury will
hold an actor to knowledge of the risk of harm that a "reasonable person would have perceived
under the circumstances." See supra note 55.
58. This is the "fine line" concern that the insurability courts voice. An indirect assault on
the power of the jury may not be too farfetched an explanation for the insurability
phenomenon. See infra notes 67-75 and accompanying text.
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both among laypersons and jurists.5 9
The opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States in Smith
v. Wade60 demonstrates that this confusion exists even at, what some
might label, the highest plane of American jurisprudence. The Justices' exhaustive manipulation of authority in support of their respective positions proved neither illuminating nor dispositive of the issue;
in fact, the majority ultimately did not rely upon "weight of authority" as a rationale for its holding. 6' After reasserting that the purpose
of punitive damages is to punish and deter "outrageous" conduct,6 2
Justice Brennan articulated the majority's perception of the real issue:
The focus is on the character of the tortfeasor's conductwhether it is of the sort that calls for deterrence and punishment
over and above that provided by compensatory awards. If it is of
such a character, then it is appropriate to allow a jury to assess
punitive damages ....To put it differently, society has an interest
in deterring and punishing all intentional or reckless invasions of
the rights of others, even though it sometimes chooses not to
impose any liability for lesser degrees of fault.63
This language candidly sets forth the underlying inquiry common to all punitive damages standards, irrespective of legal jargon:
does this particular conduct "call for" the degree of punishment and
deterrence that punitive damages are designed to provide? So stated,
59. Critics should not limit the "fine-line" concern to juries: judges disagree among
themselves as to whether, when, and where to "draw the line." The Supreme Court decided to
use a recklessness standard only by a five-to-four majority in Smith. Writing for the majority
and the first dissent respectively, Justices Brennan and Rehnquist cited exhaustive authority in
support of their respective positions (occasionally citing the same case for inconsistent
propositions), and questioned the other's understanding of the basic tort principles underlying
punitive damages and application of case law. See also Taylor v. Superior Court, 24 Cal. 3d
890, 897-99, 598 P.2d 854, 857-59, 157 Cal. Rptr. 693, 697-98 (1979) (evidence that drinking
increases the probability of accidents); id. at 907, 598 P.2d at 864, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 704 (Clark,
J., dissenting) (drunken driving does not necessarily present a probable risk of harm and
therefore, is not necessarily reckless). Compare Jones v. V.I.P. Dev. Co., 15 Ohio St. 3d 90,
472 N.E.2d 1046 (1984) (holding that employer's failure to warn workers of a dangerous
condition could constitute intentional misconduct and, therefore, allowing executrix of
employee's estate to sue, despite workers' compensation) with Brown v. Maxey, 124 Wis. 2d
426, 369 N.W.2d 677 (1985) (analogous conduct arguably attained reckless level of
culpability).
Judges seem no more consistent or objective at "line-drawing" than do juries. Is the
implication that no one is qualified to evaluate culpability? See American Sur. Co. of New
York v. Gold, 375 F.2d 523, 527 (10th Cir. 1966) ("fallibility of man makes some jury error
inevitable"). Should not the same precept apply to judges?
60. 461 U.S. 30 (1983).
61. In a separate dissent in Smith, Justice O'Connor presented the inquiry as a choice
between conflicting public policies. As for the weight of authority, Justice O'Connor stated
"[tihe battle of the string citations can have no winner." 461 U.S. at 93.
62. Id. at 54 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(1) (1979)).
63. Id. at 54-55.
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the question implies the answer that punitive damages are appropriate
for conduct that deserves them. 6' Essentially, the dispute in Smith
concerned the location of the point along the "continuum of culpability" at which punitive damages would be appropriate. The Supreme
Court allowed a punitive damages award for a lower threshold of culpability-recklessness- because a five-to-four majority thought it
appropriate. Then, by stating that society has an interest in punishing
and deterring reckless conduct and proffering this interest as justification for the imposition of punitive damages, the majority contrived an
ostensibly objective rule of law as an underpinning for an unavoidably
subjective evaluation. The kernel of this analysis is that one often
employs objective standards in a circular fashion to justify subjective
judgments of culpability. Discomforting though it may be, there are
ultimately
no objective guidelines; conduct is as culpable as we think
65
it is.

64. Thus, the propriety question becomes highly individualized according to the peculiar
facts and circumstances of the case. Winn & Lovett Grocery Co. v. Archer, 126 Fla. 308, 327,
171 So. 214, 221 (1936) (punitive damages must be decided on a "case-by-case" basis); Brown
v. Maxey, 124 Wis. 2d 426, 431-32, 369 N.W.2d 677, 680-81 (1985) (same); Wangen v. Ford
Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d 260, 302, 294 N.W.2d 437, 459 (1980) (same); cf. Walker v. Sheldon, 10
N.Y.2d 401, 179 N.E.2d 497, 223 N.Y.S.2d 488 (1961) (assessing the moral culpability of the
particular conduct under scrutiny). But cf. Tuttle v. Raymond, 494 A.2d 1353, 1362 (Me.
1985) (establishing a narrow standard, actual malice, adopted to reduce the vague and
uncertain application of the doctrine).
65. One may dispute the extent of this subjectivity by asserting the existence of a
qualitative difference between negligence and recklessness, as opposed to a simple difference in
degree. Arguably, negligence and recklessness qualitatively differ in two areas: (1) the extent of
the risk of harm, and (2) the actor's state of mind:
(1) The extent of the risk of harm: Obviously, assessing the extent of the risk of harm is
also subject to a continuum analysis and, therefore, is highly subjective. One may interpret
loosely the "strong probability" of harm requirement of recklessness so as to subsume conduct
that most would characterize as mere negligence. See Ellis, supra note 9, at 37. If a court is
predisposed toward punishing and deterring a certain type of conduct, it may pronounce that
the conduct under scrutiny poses the requisite risk of harm and, therefore, rises to the level of
recklessness. Thus, the court may convincingly hold out a "qualitatively" distinct standard to
legitimize what is essentially a highly subjective and circular analysis. Compare Taylor v.
Superior Court, 24 Cal. 3d 890, 899, 598 P.2d 854, 859, 157 Cal. Rptr. 693, 698 (1979)
(recognizing the concern that "[d]runken drivers are extremely dangerous people" and
asserting the need to punish and deter such conduct) with id. at 907, 598 P.2d at 864, 157 Cal.
Rptr. at 704 (Clark, J., dissenting) (protesting that drunk driving does not present a great
enough risk of harm so as to amount to recklessness).
The use of "outrageousness" as a standard for intentional infliction of emotional distress
is analogous:
Liability has been found only where the conduct has been so outrageous ... as to
...be regarded as ... utterly intolerable in a civilized community. Generally,
the case is one in which the recitation of the facts to an average member of the
community would arouse his resentment against the actor, and lead him to
exclaim, 'Outrageous!'
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 comment d (1965). See also Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S.
30, 54 (1983) (citing with approval RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(1) (1979) and
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Critics of the doctrine may suffer further discomfort because the
major portion of this subjective evaluation falls within the dominion
of the jury. Once the trial court determines that, as a matter of law,
the facts of the case at bar could warrant a punitive award, the court
places the punitive damages issue into the jury's hands.66 The jury's
function is twofold: it decides whether the defendant's conduct actually merits punitive liability,6 7 and, if so, it assesses an appropriate
award in dollar terms.6 8 Although the jury traditionally has broad
discretion in the performance of these two functions,6 9 judges very
contending that punitive damages are appropriate for conduct that calls for punishment and
deterrence); Brown v. Maxey, 124 Wis. 2d 426, 431-32, 369 N.W.2d 677, 680-81 (1985) ("outrageous" is an "abbreviation" for the punitive damages standard); Wangen v. Ford Motor Co.,
97 Wis. 2d 260, 268, 294 N.W.2d 437, 442 (1980) (same); Givelber, supra note 51, at 52-53 &
nn.52-59 (noting that § 46 offers no guidelines: "Outrageous conduct ... is conduct that is
outrageous."); id. at 53 n.54 (quoting Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart,
J.,concurring) wherein Justice Stewart issued the following standard for "hard core" pornography: "I know it when I see it .... ").
(2) The actor'sstate of mind: At first glance, the two standards appear to differ inasmuch
as negligence encompasses a duty to investigate, whereas recklessness depends on actual
knowledge (either of the risk or of facts that would lead a reasonable person to perceive the
risk). See supra note 58 and accompanying text. Nevertheless, this qualitative distinction also
falters upon analysis. "Knowledge" is necessarily an elusive element of any cause of action.
Two "continuum" problems arise within the knowledge context. First, how much actual
knowledge or information would lead a reasonable person to perceive the risk of harm? If we
return briefly to the hypothetical described above, see supra p. 115, and we withdraw the
assumption as to the driver's specific knowledge of the school's existence, these knowledge
issues become critical. Need the driver have seen a sign proclaiming the location of the
approaching school in order to support a finding of recklessness? Or, perhaps a jury would
find that a mere billboard announcing a nearby restaurant would lead a reasonable person to
recognize the risk of harm. Second, how egregious must a situation be before a factfinder will
assume knowledge on the part of the actor? Similarly, what if the driver had passed two
school signs, but on both occasions, claims to have been preoccupied with a faulty windshield
wiper? Were a jury to refuse this explanation, in effect, the jury would be finding the driver
reckless on the basis of constructive knowledge. Would the jury make the same finding if the
driver had passed only a single sign? Subjectivity is unavoidable.
66. Soderbeck v. Burnett County, 752 F.2d 285, 291 (7th Cir. 1985); Wackenhut Corp. v.
Canty, 359 So. 2d 430, 435-36 (Fla. 1978); Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d 260, 298,
294 N.W.2d 437, 457 (1980); Topolewski v. Plankinton Packing Co., 143 Wis. 52, 71, 126
N.W.2d 554, 561 (1910); K. REDDEN, supra note 12, § 3.4, at 56 n.73.
67. Wackenhut Corp. v. Canty, 359 So. 2d 430, 436 (Fla. 1978); Wangen v. Ford Motor
Co., 97 Wis. 2d 260, 302, 294 N.W.2d 437, 458 (1980).
68. Wackenhut Corp. v. Canty, 359 So. 2d 430, 436 (Fla. 1978); Wangen v. Ford Motor
Co., 97 Wis. 2d 260, 302, 294 N.W.2d 437, 458-59 (1980).
69. See Reynolds v. Pegler, 123 F. Supp. 36, 38-39 (S.D.N.Y. 1954) (contrasting
compensatory damages with punitive damages, which by their nature, do not permit objective
assessment and, therefore, necessarily vest the jury with broad discretion as to both allowance
and amount), afl'd, 223 F.2d 429 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 846 (1955); Goddard v.
Grand Trunk Ry., 57 Me. 202, 227 (1869) (in assessing punitive damages, reasonable men may
differ and, therefore, this discretion is entrusted to the jury to the extent that it does not act
dishonestly); Sandifer Oil Co. v. Dew, 220 Miss. 609, 624, 71 So. 2d 752, 755 (1954) (assessing
amount of punitive awards is solely within the jury's discretion).
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frequently disapprove of the jury's discretion in this context.70 Courts
and commentators express concern that, in light of jurors' lack of
expertise, this discretion is excessive, permitting of capricious, undeserved, and unrestrained awards."' They argue that an improper
assessment or application of the doctrine could easily lead to a
defendant's financial ruin.72 In fact, as Professor Ellis noted, "[t]he
combination of vague terminology and jury discretion has several
70. Schwarz, Deterrence and Punishment in the Common Law of Punitive Damages. A
Comment, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 133, 146-47 (1982) (judges find jury discretion troublesome in
punitive damages context). Professor Schwarz contributed to the preparation of a
questionnaire which the California Legislature's Joint Committee on Tort Liability submitted
to California's 500 Superior Court judges, almost half of whom responded. The following
responses are excerpts from this survey:
Question III-B- 1-1.
Do you regard the jury's pain-and-suffering calculations as:
a.
Almost always sensible.
8.4%
b. Generally sensible.
63.2%
c.
Sometimes sensible, sometimes not.
24.3%
d.
Generally not sensible.
4.2%
e.
Almost always not sensible.
0%
Question III-B-2-2.
Do you regard the jury's assessment of the amount of punitive damages as:
a.
Almost always sensible.
3.2%
b.
Generally sensible.
35.2%
c. Sometimes sensible, sometimes not.
45.4%
d. Generally not sensible.
15.7%
e. Almost always not sensible.
0.5%
Id.
In response to Question III-B-2-6, 56% of the judges supported divesting the jury of its
discretion to determine both "the allowance and amount of punitive damages," and revesting
this discretion in the trial court. Id.
71. See Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 88 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (expressing
concern that "elastic" recklessness standard gives "free reign to the biases and prejudices of
juries"); Moore v. Remington Arms, 100 Il. App. 3d 1102, 1114-15, 427 N.E.2d 608, 617
(1981) (redefining the standard for punitive awards in products liability context because of the
"need for tight judicial control" of awards); Spokane Truck & Dray Co. v. Hoefer, 2 Wash. 45,
54-55, 25 P. 1072, 1074 (1891) (partially premising its decision to abolish the doctrine on "the
unguided judgment of the jury"); C. MCCORMICK, supra note 39, at 276 ("exemplary damages
are limited only by the caprice of the jurors"); Brandwen, Punitive-Exemplary Damages in
Labor Relations Litigation, 29 U. CHI. L. REV. 460, 466-69 nn.35-51 (1962) (because juries are
unable to apply standards predictably, the jury's broad discretion should be vested in the
judge); Ellis, supra note 9, at 38 (the jury is vested with broad discretion to apply standards
which it generally does not understand); Walther & Plein, Punitive Damages: A Critical
Analysis, 49 MARQ. L. REV. 369 (1965) (noting that prejudice and caprice often motivate
jurors in assessing punitive damages); Note, The Publicly Held Corporation and the
Insurability of Punitve Damages, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 1383 & n.42 (1985) (citing Seltzer,
PunitiveDamages in Mass Tort Litigation: Addressing the Problems of Fairness,Efficiency, and
Control, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 37, 49-50 (1983) for the proposition that juries lack experience
to assess appropriate awards).
72. Brown v. Maxey, 124 Wis. 2d 426, 446, 369 N.W.2d 677, 688 (1985) (citing Cieslewicz
v. Mutual Serv. Casualty Ins. Co, 84 Wis. 2d 91, 103-04, 267 N.W.2d 595, 601 (1978)). But see
Harrell v. Travelers Indem. Co., 279 Or. 199, 225, 567 P.2d 1013, 1025 (1977) (Holman, J.,
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ramifications. There is little assurance that those upon whom puni-

tive damages are assessed committed a wrongful act, or that those not
assessed therein did not, however 'wrongful act' may be defined." '73 A
court that regards these as valid criticisms may stem such harsh and
unjust applications of the doctrine by allowing insurability. This concern appears to be a recurring theme in the insurability decisions and
highly persuasive among those courts allowing coverage.7 4

III.

INSURABILITY:

PUBLIC POLICY AND THE
INSURANCE POLICY

An insurance policy is a type of contract to which all the general
principles and limitations of contract law apply, as well as some principles peculiar to the law of insurance. 7 ' Thus, in view of the longdissenting); cf. Tuttle v. Raymond, 494 A.2d 1353, 1359 (Me. 1985) (flexibility in amount of
award is one of the doctrine's assets).
For additional judicial "checks" on the jury's discretion, see Zarcone v. Perry, 572 F.2d
52, 56-57 (2d Cir. 1978) (articulating standard for overturning an award: "so high as to shock
the judicial conscience"); Malco, Inc. v. Midwest Aluminum Sales, Inc., 14 Wis. 2d 57, 64-65,
109 N.W.2d 516, 520 (1961) (remittitur); see supra note 51 (declining to submit the issue to the
jury). But see Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974) (wherein the Supreme
Court stated: "In most jurisdictions jury discretion over the amounts awarded is limited only
by the gentle rule that they not be excessive. Consequently, juries assess punitive damages in
wholly unpredictable amounts bearing no necessary relation to the actual harm caused.")
73. Ellis, supra note 9, at 39-40.
74. See Abbie Uriguen Oldsmobile Buick, Inc. v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 95 Idaho
501, 507, 511 P.2d 783, 789 (1973) (citing Northwestern Nat'l Casualty Co. v. McNulty, 307
F.2d 432, 444 (5th Cir. 1962) (Gewin, J., concurring) (Although McNulty disallowed
insurability, Judge Gewin expressed concern as to the "doubtful and unpredictable uncertainty
of judges and juries as they undertake to place the conduct of the wrongdoer in the categories
of willful, intentional, wanton, gross, reckless, or other categories of negligence."); Colson v.
Lloyd's of London, 435 S.W.2d 42, 47 (Mo. Ct. App. 1968) (allowing police officers to insure
against all liability for intentional false imprisonment because such suits invariably include
claims for punitive damages, thereby implying that factfinders are unable to separate the
appropriate claims); First Bank (N.A.)-Billings v. Transamerica Ins. Co., -

Mont. -,

-,

679

P.2d 1217, 1222 (1984) ("different factfinders in similar fact situations may reach differing
conclusions as to the availability of punitive damages"); Harrell v. Travelers Indem. Co., 279
Or. 199, 212 n.14, 567 P.2d 1013, 1019 n.14 (quoting the concurring opinion from Lazenby);
Lazenby v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 214 Tenn. 639, 655, 383 S.W.2d 1, 8 (1964)
(White, J., concurring) (different juries reach different results on the same facts); see also
Brown v. Maxey, 124 Wis. 2d 426, 440, 369 N.W.2d 677, 684-85 (1985). For the proposition
that although the law furnishes no mechanical rule to assess punitive awards, it lies within the
jury's discretion to set a sane estimate so as not to shock the judicial conscience, see id. (citing
Fahrenberg v. Tengel, 96 Wis. 2d 211, 236, 291 N.W.2d 516, 527 (1980)). The Brown court,
however, did not explicitly propose this aspect of the doctrine as a rationale for its procoverage holding. Cf. Harris v. County of Racine, 512 F. Supp. 1273, 1282 (E.D. Wis. 1981)
(juries and courts may hold civil servants liable retroactively for punitive damages although
they arguably had acted in good faith). But see American Sur. Co. of New York v. Gold, 375
F.2d 523, 527 (10th Cir. 1966) (assumption that a jury cannot fairly designate conduct meriting
punitive award impugns the integrity of the jury system).
75. Courts strongly protect the reasonable expectations of the insured. It is partly in the
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standing public policy favoring freedom

of contract,7 6 courts

endeavor to enforce an insurance policy whenever possible." Courts,
however, tend to void insurance contracts that controvert other
"overriding" public policies.7" Courts generally agree that overriding
public policy considerations prohibit insurability of criminal fines7 9
and damages for intentional harm. 0 Often, however, evaluating and
construction of ambiguous terms that insurance policies are distinct from ordinary contracts; it
is generally presumed that the insurer, as the party of greater expertise, and as the drafting
party, has the opportunity to draft a clear policy so as not to disappoint the reasonable
expectations of the insured. Therefore, courts usually construe ambiguous terms in an
insurance policy against the insurer. Skyline Harvestore Sys. Inc. v. Centennial Ins. Co., 331
N.W.2d 106, 107 (Iowa 1983); Harrell v. Travelers Indem. Co., 279 Or. 199, 204, 567 P.2d
1013, 1015 (1977); Carroway v. Johnson, 245 S.C. 200, 203-04, 139 S.E.2d 908, 909-10 (1965);
Lazenby v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 214 Tenn. 639, 648, 383 S.W.2d 1, 5 (1964);
Hensley v. Erie Ins. Co., 283 S.E.2d 227, 228-29 (W. Va. 1981); Brown v. Maxey, 124 Wis. 2d
426, 442, 369 N.W.2d 677, 685-686 (1985) (quoting from Kremers- Urban Co. v. American
Employers Ins. Co., 119 Wis. 2d 722, 735-36, 351 N.W.2d 156, 163 (1984)), cf Sun Oil Co. v.
Vickers Ref. Co., 414 F.2d 383, 390 (8th Cir. 1969) (disfavoring voiding contracts because of
presumption of ambiguous terms' legality); Tedesco v. Maryland Casualty Co., 127 Conn. 533,
537, 18 A.2d 357, 359 (1941) (where policy language is open to two reasonable interpretations,
one of which contravenes public policy, that interpretation should be avoided); Nicholson v.
American Fire & Casualty Ins. Co., 177 So. 2d 52, 54 (Fla. 2d DCA 1965) (regardless of policy
language, insured had no right to expect certain coverage in the first place) (cited with
approval in American Sur. Co. v. Gold, 375 F.2d 523, 526 (10th Cir. 1966)); Harrell,279 Or. at
223, 567 P.2d at 1024 (Holman, J., dissenting) (an insured's expectation of "being above the
law of punitive damages" cannot be reasonable).
76. See Brown v. Maxey, 124 Wis. 2d 426, 446-47, 369 N.W.2d 677, 687-88 (1985);
Cieslewicz v. Mutual Serv. Casualty Ins. Co., 84 Wis. 2d 91, 103, 267 N.W.2d 595, 601 (1978)
(citing with approval Price v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 108 Ariz. 485, 487, 502 P.2d
522, 524 (1972)).
77. See Sun Oil Co. v. Vickers Ref. Co., 414 F.2d 383, 390 (8th Cir. 1969); Maryland-Nat'l
Capital Park & Planning Comm'n. v. Washington Nat'l Arena, 282 Md. 588, 606, 386 A.2d
1216, 1229 (1978); Wallihan v. Hughes, 196 Va. 117, 124, 82 S.E.2d 553, 558 (1954).
78. See Industrial Sugars, Inc. v. Standard Accident Ins. Co., 338 F.2d 673, 676 (1964);
Sternaman v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 170 N.Y. 13, 19, 62 N.E. 763, 764, (1902) (contracts
violative of law or public policy are void, despite general rule favoring freedom to contract);
Isenhart v. General Casualty Co. of Am., 233 Or. 49, 52, 377 P.2d 26, 27 (1962) (intentional
misconduct); Holsen v. Marshall & Ilsley Bank, 52 Wis. 2d 281, 284, 190 N.W.2d 189, 191
(1971) (courts may void contracts that contravene public policy).
79. See Kraus v. Allstate Ins. Co., 258 F. Supp. 407, 412-13 (W.D. Pa. 1966); see also
American Sur. Co. v. Gold, 375 F.2d 523, 526 (10th Cir. 1966) (arguing that the public policy
prohibiting criminal fine insurability applies by analogy to punitive damages); Northwestern
Nat'l Casualty Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432, 440 (5th Cir. 1962) (same); Tedesco v.
Maryland Casualty Co., 127 Conn. 533, 538, 18 A.2d 357, 359 (1941) (same). But cf Brown v.
Maxey, 124 Wis. 2d 426, 444-45, 369 N.W.2d 677, 687 (1985) (citing Harris v. County of
Racine, 512 F. Supp. 1273, 1281 (E.D. Wis. 1981), for the proposition that the freedom to
contract predominates over the policy underlying the disallowance of the insurability,
although acknowledging the validity of the latter); Cieslewicz v. Mutual Serv. Casualty Ins.
Co., 84 Wis. 2d 91, 104, 267 NW.2d 595, 599-600 (1978) (same).
80. See Northwestern Nat'l Casualty Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432, 440 (5th Cir. 1962);
Haser v. Maryland Casualty Co., 78 N.D. 893, 990, 53 N.W.2d 508, 512 (1952); cf I.R.C.
§ 162(f) (1984) (disallowing the deduction of penalties and fines). But cf Wolff v. General
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balancing competing public policies produces less-uniform results.
Determining whether a contract contradicts public policy often
becomes a vague inquiry as to whether or not such contracts work
against the public welfare. 8' Thus, a court predisposed to uphold a
particular contract may require that the violation of public policy be a
"clear one, "82 and absent such a showing, the court will prefer the
competing policy which favors freedom to contract.8 3 Without con-

trolling authority, courts can easily manipulate these amorphous public policy arguments to support their conclusions.
It is important to bear this in mind in analyzing how courts treat
the issue of punitive damages insurability. If public policy questions
depend upon subjective judicial determinations as to public welfare,
then deciding whether insuring against punitive damages liability contravenes public policy involves nothing more than a subjective evaluation of the punitive damages doctrine itself. Some courts simply
doubt that the doctrine, in its present state, significantly serves public
policy. In these courts, the public policy favoring the freedom to contract will prevail. It is from this perspective that the analysis of the
insurability issue will proceed.
IV.

THE ANTI-COVERAGE POSITION:

THE

McNulty

APPROACH

The leading case supporting the proposition that insurance coverage of punitive damages liability contravenes public policy is Northwestern National Casualty Co. v. McNulty. 84 In McNulty, the victim
Casualty Co. of Am., 68 N.M. 292, 295-96, 361 P.2d 330, 333-34 (1961) (citing exceptions to
the general rule).
81. See In re Adoption of MM, 652 P.2d 974, 978 (Wyo. 1982).
82. See National Mill Supply Co. v. State ex rel. Morton, 211 Ind. 243, 249, 6 N.E.2d 543,
545-46 (1937); Harrell v. Travelers Indem. Co., 279 Or. 199, 206-07, 567 P.2d 1013, 1016-17
(1977); Wallihan v. Hughes, 196 Va. 117, 124-25, 82 S.E.2d 553, 558 (1954). A court that is
uneasy with the application of punitive damages or dubious as to its societal value is unlikely
to recognize the existence of a "clear" public policy against insurability.
83. See Price v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 108 Ariz. 485, 487, 502 P.2d 522, 524
(1972); Brown v. Maxey, 124 Wis. 2d 426, 444-47, 369 N.W.2d 677, 687-88 (1985); Cieslewicz
v. Mutual Serv. Casualty Ins. Co., 84 Wis. 2d 91, 103, 267 N.W.2d 595, 601 (1978). But see
Harrell v. Travelers Indem. Co., 279 Or. 199, 222, 228-29, 567 P.2d 1013, 1024, 1027 (1977)
(Holman, J., dissenting) (contending that the majority conducted no real public policy inquiry
at all-the inquiry should have been whether freedom to contract could allow punitive damage
coverage in the first place).
84. 307 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1962). Courts considering the insurability issue frequently
adopt or refute the majority's language and arguments from this opinion. For authorities
adhering to the anti-coverage position, see Brown v. Chaffee, 612 F.2d 497 (10th Cir. 1979);
Caplan v. Johnson, 414 F.2d 615 (5th Cir. 1969); American Sur. Co. v. Gold, 375 F.2d 523
(10th Cir. 1966); American Ins. Co. v. Saulnier, 242 F. Supp. 257 (D. Conn. 1965); Peterson v.
Superior Court, 31 Cal. 3d 147, 642 P.2d 1305, 181 Cal. Rptr. 784 (1982); Gleason v. Fryer, 30
Colo. App. 106, 491 P.2d 85 (1971); Tedesco v. Maryland Casualty Co., 127 Conn. 533, 18
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of a car accident sued the insurer of the drunken driver who had recklessly injured him. The plaintiff sought to recover the punitive damages award which the state court had previously levied against the
insured driver.85 The inquiry was whether public policy would permit
such coverage. 8 6 The McNulty court held that to allow the driver to
A.2d 357 (1941); Guarantee Abstract & Title Co. v. Interstate Fire & Casualty Co., 228 Kan.
532, 618 P.2d 1195 (1980); Braley v. Berkshire Mut. Ins. Co., 440 A.2d 359 (Me. 1982);
Wojciak v. Northern Packaging Corp., 310 N.W.2d 675 (Minn. 1981); Caspersen v. Webber,
298 Minn. 93, 213 N.W.2d 327 (1973); Crull v. Gleb, 382 S.W.2d 17 (Mo. Ct. App. 1964);
Variety Farms v. New Jersey Mfrs. Ins. Co., 172 N.J. Super. 10, 410 A.2d 696 (Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1980); City of Newark v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 134 N.J. Super. 537, 342
A.2d 513 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1975); LoRocco v. New Jersey Mfrs. Indem. Ins. Co., 82 N.J.
Super. 323, 197 A.2d 591 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1964); Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v.
Village of Hempstead, 48 N.Y.2d 218, 397 N.E.2d 737, 422 N.Y.S.2d 47 (1979); Parker v.
Agricultural Ins. Co., 109 Misc. 2d 678, 440 N.Y.S.2d 964 (Sup. Ct. 1981); Nationwide Mut.
Ins. Co. v Knight, 34 N.C. App. 96, 237 S.E.2d 341 (1977); Esmond v. Liscio, 209 Pa. Super.
200, 224 A.2d 793 (1966).
For authorities adhering to the pro-coverage position, see Harris v. County of Racine, 512
F. Supp 1273 (E.D. Wis. 1981); Fagot v. Ciravola, 445 F. Supp. 342 (E.D. La. 1978);
Employers Ins. Co. v. Brock, 233 Ala. 551, 172 So. 671 (1937); Providence Washington Ins.
Co. of Alaska v. City of Valdez, 684 P.2d 861 (Alaska 1984); Price v. Hartford Accident &
Indem. Co., 108 Ariz. 485, 502 P.2d 522 (1972); Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Ins. Co. v.
Daniel, 246 Ark. 849, 440 S.W.2d 582 (1969); Greenwood Cemetery, Inc. v. Travelers Indem.
Co., 238 Ga. 313, 232 S.E.2d 910 (1977); Abbie Uriguen Oldsmobile Buick, Inc. v. United
States Fire Ins. Co., 95 Idaho 501, 511 P.2d 783 (1973); Skyline Harvestore Sys., Inc. v.
Centennial Ins. Co., 331 N.W.2d 106 (Iowa 1983); City of Cedar Rapids v. Northwestern Nat'l
Ins. Co., 304 N.W.2d 228 (Iowa 1981); Continental Ins. Co. v. Hancock, 507 S.W.2d 146 (Ky.
1973); First Nat'l Bank of St. Mary's v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 283 Md. 228, 389 A.2d 359
(1978); Anthony v. Frith, 394 So. 2d 867 (Miss. 1981); Colson v. Lloyd's of London, 435
S.W.2d 42 (Mo. Ct. App. 1968); Fitzgerald v. Western Fire Ins. Co., - Mont. -, 679 P.2d
790 (1984); First Bank (N.A.)-Billings v. Transamerica Ins. Co., - Mont. -, 679 P.2d 1217
(1984); Wolff v. General Casualty Co. of Am., 68 N.M. 292, 361 P.2d 330 (1961); Mazza v.
Medical Mut. Ins. Co., 311 N.C. 621, 319 S.E.2d 217 (1984); Harrell v. Travelers Indem. Co.,
279 Or. 199, 567 P.2d 1013 (1977); Morrell v. Lalonde, 45 R.I. 112, 120 A. 435 (1923);
Carroway v. Johnson, 245 S.C. 200, 139 S.E.2d 908 (1965); Lazenby v. Universal Underwriters
Ins. Co., 214 Tenn. 639, 383 S.W.2d 1 (1964); Dairyland County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wallgren,
477 S.W.2d 341 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972); State v. Glen Fall Ins. Co., 137 Vt. 313, 404 A.2d 101
(1979); Lipscombe v. Security Ins. Co., 213 Va. 81, 189 S.E.2d 320 (1972); Hensley v. Erie Ins.
Co., 283 S.E.2d 227 (W. Va. 1981); Brown v. Maxey, 124 Wis. 2d 426, 369 N.W.2d 677 (1985);
Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Columbia Casualty Co., 682 P.2d 975 (Wyo. 1984). See also Ohio
Casualty Co. v. Welfare Fin. Co., 75 F.2d 58 (8th Cir. 1934) (allowing insurability for
vicarious punitive liability); Grant v. North River Ins. Co., 453 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Ind.
1978) (same); Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v United States Concrete Pipe Co., 369 So. 2d
451 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979) (same); Sterling Ins. Co. v. Hughes, 187 So. 2d 898 (Fla. 3d DCA
1966) (same); Beaver v. Country Mut. Ins. Co., 95 Ill. App. 3d 1122, 420 N.E.2d 1058 (1981)
(same); Dayton Hudson Corp. v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 621 P.2d 1155 (Okla. 1980)
(same); cf Wojciak v. Northern Packaging Corp., 310 N.W.2d 675 (Minn. 1981) (allowing
insurability of statutory damages, as opposed to common law punitive damages, does not
contravene public policy); Cieslewicz v. Mutual Serv. Casualty Ins. Co., 84 Wis. 2d 91, 267
N.W.2d 595 (1978) (allowing insurability of multiple statutory damages, though not speaking
definitively as to the common law doctrine).
85. McNulty, 307 F.2d at 433.
86. Id. at 436-37 & n.11.
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use insurance to deflect his punitive liability would frustrate the societal benefits of the doctrine-punishment and deterrence.8" Public policy demanded that the driver-not the insurer-be directly
responsible for such an award.8" The court avoided any discussion of
whether the contract provided such coverage, regarding the terms of
the contract as irrelevant: even if the contract contemplated such
coverage, it would be void.8 9 The court recognized that a strong public policy favored deterring and punishing reckless "slaughter or
maiming" on the highways,9 ° and that the purpose of punitive damages is to punish and deter such undesirable conduct, especially when
criminal sanctions appear insufficient for this purpose. 9 The court
87. Id. at 435 & n.6 (citing Comment, FactorsAffecting Punitive Damages, 7 MIAMI L.Q.
517 (1953)). The McNulty court also noted that other jurisdictions applied the doctrine for
other purposes. Id. at 434 & n.3. Therefore, the court limited its holding to cases in which the
doctrine's primary purposes are punishment and deterrence. Id. at 442.
88. Id. at 441-42.
89. Id. at 434; Harrell v. Travelers Indem. Co., 279 Or. 199, 222, 567 P.2d 1013, 1024
(1977) (Holman, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 786 (1971), for
the proposition that the court's function is not to determine merely coverage, but also whether
the allowance of such coverage is socially desirable); see also American Sur. Co. v. Gold, 375
F.2d 523, 526 (10th Cir. 1966) (ignoring contract analysis because insured "has no right to
expect the law to allow him to place responsibility for his reckless and wanton actions on
someone else," and citing Nicholson v. American Fire & Casualty Co., 177 So. 2d 52, 54 (Fla.
2d DCA 1965)).
90. McNulty, 307 F.2d at 441 & n.17; see also Taylor v. Superior Court, 24 Cal. 3d 890,
899, 598 P.2d 854, 859, 157 Cal. Rptr. 693, 698 (1979) (recognizing that "drunken drivers are
extremely dangerous people"); Harrell v. Travelers Indem. Co., 279 Or. 199, 219-20, 567 P.2d
1013, 1023 (1977) (Holman, J., dissenting) (citing Harrell v. Ames, 265 Or. 183, 190, 508 P.2d
211, 214-15 (1973), wherein the Supreme Court of Oregon had recognized a strong need to use
"all possible means" of deterring drunk-driving-including punitive damages.). But cf Price
v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 108 Ariz. 485, 487, 502 P.2d 522, 524 (1972) (no evidence
that uninsured awards deter drunk-driving); Lazenby v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 214
Tenn. 639, 647, 383 S.W.2d 1, 5 (1964) (recognizing the severity of the drunk-driving problem,
but doubting whether punitive damages is the solution).
91. McNulty, 307 F.2d at 441-42; Kink v. Combs, 28 Wis. 2d 65, 80, 135 N.W.2d 789, 798
(1965). It is significant that courts interpret the absence of empirical data as to the deterrence
of punitive damages in different ways. First, anti-coverage courts claim that criminal sanctions
are insufficient and courts must use all available means of deterrence. Second, some procoverage courts contend that criminal sanctions appear to be an ineffective deterrent, and
therefore, to assert that civil penalties would succeed where criminal sanctions had failed
would be pure "speculation." See, e.g., Lazenby v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 214 Tenn.
639, 647, 383 S.W.2d 1, 5 (1964). This argument, however, assumes that criminal fines are
inherently more effective as a deterrent force than are potentially large punitive damage
awards. Inasmuch as severe criminal penalties for drunk-driving constitute a recent
phenomenon, this argument may rest on an unsound assumption. Third, other pro-coverage
courts claim that the existence of criminal penalties provides an alternatesource of deterrence,
thereby justifying the softened impact of the actual award that results from allowing insurance.
See, e.g., Price v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 108 Ariz. 485, 487, 502 P.2d 522, 524
(1972) (suggesting that criminal penalties, including possible loss of license and compulsory
attendance at traffic school provide a sufficient substitute). It is curious that pro-coverage
courts espouse both of the latter mutually inconsistent interpretations. Some pro-coverage
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reasoned:
Where a person is able to insure himself against punishment he
gains a freedom of misconduct inconsistent with the establishment
of sanctions against such misconduct. It is not disputed that insurance against criminal fines or penalties would be void as violative
of public policy. The same public policy should invalidate any
contract of insurance
against the civil punishment that punitive
92
damages represent.

The court cited Tedesco v. Maryland Casualty Co. 93 for the
undisputed proposition that insuring against a criminal fine is against
legislated public policy. 94 The court extended this reasoning by stating that there is "no difference in principle between public policy as
established by the legislature and public policy established by the
juiciary." 95 Essentially, the court looked favorably upon punitive
damages, especially in the context of highway safety; any practice that
prevented the doctrine from punishing and deterring "highway
slaughter" was detrimental to the general welfare, and therefore, contravened public policy. The court in McNulty saw "no point in punishing the insurance company [which had] done no wrong. "96
Insurability also would have the illogical effect of allowing the wrongdoer to satisfy his "smart money" 97 obligation without feeling the
smart. The court found the following economic argument persuasive:
insurability ultimately would punish the public because insurers
would shift their loss to the public by means of inflated premiums.
Thus, insurability would cause punitive damages to punish the public
for whose benefit they had been imposed. Such an absurd result
would completely defeat the purpose of awarding the damages,98
while retaining the doctrine's often-criticized "windfall" aspect. 99
Although it set forth additional misgivings"°° about insurability, these
courts assert that because criminal sanctions are effective, extra deterrence in the form of
punitive damages is unnecessary. Inconsistently, other pro-coverage courts contend that
because criminal sanctions are ineffective, it is speculative to assume that punitive damages are
otherwise. In this respect, the pro-coverage position appears somewhat contrived.
92. McNulty, 307 F.2d at 440.
93. 127 Conn. 533, 537-38, 18 A.2d 357, 359 (1941). See supra note 80 and accompanying
text.
94. McNulty, 307 F.2d at 436-37.
95. Id. at 437.
96. Id. at 440.
97. "Smart money" refers to the financial sting of a punitive damages award. It is through
this sting that the doctrine purports to punish and deter. Suzore v. Rutherford, 35 Tenn. App.
678, 684, 251 S.W.2d 129, 131 (1952); Cieslewicz v. Mutual Serv. Casualty Ins. Co., 84 Wis. 2d
91, 102, 267 N.W.2d 595, 601 (1978).
98. McNulty, 307 F.2d at 440-41.
99. Id. at 442; see supra note 19 and accompanying text.
100. McNulty, 307 F.2d at 441. The court was concerned that allowing insurability "would
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concerns were paramount to the McNulty court.
V.

THE PRO-COVERAGE POSITION: THE

Lazenby APPROACH

Two years after McNulty, the Supreme Court of Tennessee had
before it a case with a very similar set of facts.' 0 ' Because this court
recognized similar highway safety policy concerns,"2 and agreed as to
the purpose of punitive damages,'0 3 it easily could have adopted the
reasoning and result of the McNulty court. Because the court refused
to do so, Lazenby v. Universal Underwriters Insurance Co. io4 became
the leading case in the pro-coverage line of authority. The court
based its maverick decision on three grounds:
1) it questioned the actual deterrent value of the doctrine, arguing that because criminal sanctions had failed to deter highway accidents, it would be speculative to presume that disallowing punitive
damages insurance would be any more effective; 0 5
2) it sought to protect the insured's reasonable expectations of
coverage from the menace of ambiguous drafting;0 6
3) the court expressed concern that "[tihere is often a fine line
between simple negligence and negligence upon which an award for
punitive damages can be made."' 0 7
Because both courts recognized similar policy concerns, the real
difference between the orientation of the two courts can be reduced to
the respective court's assessment of the punitive damages doctrine
and its application. This necessitates "reading between the lines" of a
particular decision.
The first concern of the Lazenby court is simply illogical as
produce a serious conflict of interest between the insurer and the insured in settlement
negotiations and in trial tactics." Id. Further, in assessing a defendant's wealth, evidence of
insurance is generally inadmissible. See Michael v. Cole, 122 Ariz. 450, 595 P.2d 995 (1979);
Odoms v. Travelers Ins. Co., 339 So. 2d 196 (Fla. 1976). This would prevent the jury from
analyzing the defendant's "financial standing" in order to assess a punitive award of an
appropriate magnitude. McNulty, 307 F.2d at 441. Finally, the McNulty court feared that
insurability would produce "[flantastic results ...having no relation to making the injured
party whole." Id.
101. Lazenby v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 214 Tenn. 639, 647-48, 383 S.W.2d 1, 1
(1964). In Lazenby, as in McNulty, the plaintiff sued the insurer of the drunken driver who
had injured her after the insurer refused to pay the punitive damages judgment which the
plaintiff had previously obtained against the insured. Id.
102. Id. at 647-48, 383 S.w.2d at 5.
103. Id.
104. 214 Tenn. 639, 383 S.w.2d 1 (1964). Lazenby is the leading pro-coverage opinion.
For an exhaustive listing of authorities adhering to the Lazenby position, see supra note 85.
105. Lazenby, 214 Tenn. at 647, 383 S.w.2d at 5.
106. Id.
107. Id.
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phrased: McNulty explicitly stated that punitive damages were necessary because available criminal sanctions were an inadequate deterrent.'0° The Lazenby court suggested that it was speculative to hope
that punitive damages could deter when criminal sanctions
apparentlty had failed to do so. This puts the Lazenby court in agreement with McNulty as to the inadequacy of criminal sanctions, and
simply calls into doubt the purported punitive and deterrent effect of
punitive damages. °9 Lazenby and its progeny also proposed that
additional increments of punishment and deterrence exist which compensate for the dilution of the doctrine: defendants may suffer
increased insurance premiums, or may not carry any insurance, or
find themselves unable to renew their policies; 11 defendants may
incur punitive liability in excess of policy limits;". or, defendants may
be subject to criminal sanctions as well as civil." 2 Yet, despite the
proposed alternative deterrents, none appears to offer any increment
of punishment and deterrence over and above that which a compensatory award would provide alone: any of these suggested alternatives
is as likely to supplement a large compensatory award as a punitive
award.
The court's second concern is somewhat circular. Lazenby and
its progeny emphasized the existence of a competing public policy,
namely, that of protecting the freedom to contract and, with it, the
reasonable expectations of contracting parties." 3 It is noteworthy
108. McNulty, 307 F.2d at 441.
109. But see American Sur. Co. v. Gold, 375 F.2d 523, 527 (10th Cir. 1966) (arguing that
although it might be speculative to assume that the doctrine is an effective deterrent, to hold a
nonculpable third party, the insurer, liable for the penalty is even less than speculative: there is
no possibility of achieving deterrence); see also supra notes 91-92 (discussing the possible
interpretations of the lack of empirical documentation of the doctrine's effectiveness).
110. Price v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 108 Ariz. 485, 487, 502 P.2d 522, 524
(1972).
111. Brown v. Maxey, 124 Wis. 2d 426, 447, 369 N.W.2d 677, 688 (1985); Price v. Hartford
Accident & Indem. Co., 108 Ariz. 485, 487, 502 P.2d 522, 524 (1972); cf. Cieslewicz v. Mutual
Serv. Casualty Ins. Co., 84 Wis. 2d 91, 104, 267 N.W.2d 595, 601 (1978) (making the same
"alternate source" arguments in the context of multiple damages). But see Harrell v. Travelers
Indem. Co., 279 Or. 199, 220, 567 P.2d 1013, 1023 (1977) (Holman, J., dissenting) ("The jury
was told to award an amount which it thought proper to deter, and it decided on the amount
of $25,000, not the amount of an insurance premium."); Brown, 124 Wis. 2d at 452, 369
N.W.2d at 690-91 (Steinmetz, J.,dissenting) (noting that the court had previously supposed
that it was a direct penalty on the pocketbook itself that deters wrongdoing-not an indirect
sanction through insurance premiums).
112. Price v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 108 Ariz. 485, 487, 502 P.2d 522, 524
(1972). But see supra note 92 (authorities claiming that because criminal sanctions alone
provide insufficient deterrence, civil sanctions are critical).
113. Price v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 108 Ariz. 485, 487, 502 P.2d 522, 524
(1972); Lazenby v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 214 Tenn. 639, 648-49, 383 S.W.2d 1, 5
(1964); see supra notes 76-84 and accompanying text.
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that most of the anti-coverage opinions did not consider contract language.' 4 In determining whether to void a contract as against public
policy, the inquiry is, notwithstanding society's interest in enforcing
contracts as written, whether the terms of the contract are violative of
a separate societal interest to such a degree that the dissolution of the
contract would best serve the public. That society has an interest in
preserving the freedom to contract is a basic assumption of all such
inquiries; yet, it is not a license for the blanket validation of contracts. 15 Thus, an implicit evaluation and weighing of the public policies underlying punitive damages necessarily preceded the invocation
of the freedom to contract doctrine. The question was not whether
the parties intended or expected to transact punitive damages coverage, but rather whether they could so contract; by focusing on contractual language, a pro-coverage court has implicitly answered the
first question affirmatively. This demonstrates that the Lazenby court
either doubted the effectiveness of the doctrine itself, or recognized a
competing public policy base for the restriction of the doctrine. 6
The third, and possibly the most pivotal, concern of the Lazenby
court focuses on a converse public policy base: society has an interest
in assuring that relatively innocent conduct not receive undue punishment. The court was troubled by the "fine line" between conduct for
which punitive damages ought to lie and that for which such an
award would be inappropriate.1 1 7 The Lazenby court implied that the
imprecise and elusive nature of punitive damages standards made it
likely that juries would levy awards against conduct which the court
itself might not deem sufficiently culpable to merit such sanction;
allowing coverage in such a case would not violate public policy.
Therefore, the court would not hold as a matter of law that coverage
114. See supra notes 76, 90 and accompanying text. Although a few anti-coverage cases
disallow insurability either partly or wholly on contract analysis, these cases constitute a
minority. See Brown v. Western Casualty & Sur. Co., 484 P.2d 1252 (Colo. Ct. App. 1971);
Schnuck Markets, Inc. v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 652 S.W.2d 206 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983);
Caspersen v. Webber, 298 Minn. 93, 213 N.W.2d 327 (1973).

115. "Since it is the task of the law to form and project, as well as mirror and reflect, we
should not, as judges, merely recite the expectations and risks without examining the
desirability of saddling them upon society." United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 786 (1971);

supra note 90.
116. The majority in Lazenby would not have asserted (indeed, no court would) that the
public policy favoring "freedom to contract" outweighed that opposing insurance against
criminal fines. See supra note 80 and accompanying text. That the court would prefer

freedom to contract over punitive damages, but not over criminal fines, demonstrates that it
deemed the policy underlying punitive damages less deserving of protection than the policy

favoring freedom to contract.
117. Lazenby, 214 Tenn. at 648, 383 S.W.2d at 5.
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of punitive damages liability was necessarily against public policy." 8
Similarly, in Harrell v. Travelers Indemnity Co., in allowing punitive

damages coverage, the Supreme Court of Oregon stated, "Suffice to
say, that the essence of our disagreement arises from the fact that
awards of punitive damages are not limited to wanton or intentional
misconduct, but extend to conduct that is grossly negligent or reckless.""' In two of the leading opinions in this line of authority then,
the potential for overbroad application of the doctrine seems to have
motivated, at least partially, the allowance of insurance coverage of

punitive damages.
Therefore, although some courts advance other arguments, 120 the
primary concerns among courts allowing punitive damage insurance
remain whether punitive damages provide any real benefit to society,
and whether the possibility of overapplication outweighs any such
societal benefit. 12' Insurability remains what courts perceive to be the
most accessible means by which to assuage these concerns. 122
118. See supra notes 28-29. Several courts have made punitive damages insurability valid
per se out of concern that to hold it invalid per se would be unfair to defendants who had been
"merely reckless." Allowing coverage, however, overcompensates by neutralizing the
doctrine's effects in all cases.
Some judges have offered suggestions for a middle ground. See Greenwood Cemetery,
Inc. v. The Travelers Indem. Co., 238 Ga. 313, 320, 232 S.E.2d 910, 915 (1977) (Hill, J.,
dissenting) (suggesting that courts prohibit insurance only when such insurance will destroy
the deterrent effect of a punitive damages award); Harrell v. Travelers Indem. Co., 279 Or.
199, 226, 567 P.2d 1013, 1026 (1977) (Holman, J., dissenting) (suggesting that courts limit the
doctrine to cases where the doctrine would have a deterrent effect); id. at 231, 567 P.2d at 1029
(Linde, J., dissenting) (suggesting that courts prohibit insurance only when such insurance will
destroy the deterrent effect of a punitive damages award).
119. Harrell v. Travelers Indem. Co., 279 Or. 199, 218 n.22, 567 P.2d 1013, 1022 n.22
(1977); supra note 9 and accompanying text.
120. The court expressed concern for the victim in Lazenby, 214 Tenn. at 645, 383 S.W.2d
at 4 (citing McNulty, 307 F.2d at 444 (Gewin, J., concurring)). A compensatory approach to
punitive damages, however, ignores the doctrine's primary rationales-punishment and
deterrence. See supra note 45. But cf. King, The Insurability of Punitive Damages: A New
Solution to an Old Dilemma, 16 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 345, 362-65 (1980) (noting that
plaintiffs often receive less than full compensation because of tax law and attorneys' fees).
Critics have also attacked the "vicarious liability" exception set forth by McNulty, 307
F.2d at 439-40. See Harrell v. Travelers Indem. Co., 279 Or. 199, 214-15, 567 P.2d 1013,
1020-21 (1977). Assuming that such an exception amounts to an illogical inconsistency, it
would make more sense to eliminate the aberration, rather than to make the rule conform to it.
For an overview of this parallel and complex issue, see Note, Insurabilityof Punitive Damages
Arising from Employee Acts, 11 J.CORP. L. 99 (1985); Note, Insurance-PunitiveDamagesDoes Kansas Allow Coverage When Liability Is Vicariously Imposed? From Guarantee to
Kline, 32 U. KAN. L. REV. 932 (1984); Annot., 16 A.L.R. 4th 11, 25-27 (1982).
121. See supra notes 7, 9, 16 and accompanying text.
122. See supra notes 1, 10, 11, 12-17 and accompanying text.
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PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN WISCONSIN

Whereas the judicial opinions of several jurisdictions suggest a
discomfort and uncertainty toward the application of the doctrine of
punitive damages, Wisconsin case law' 23 unambiguously demonstrates this judicial sentiment. Wisconsin has tended to be conservative in its application of the doctrine. 24 Its opinions have expressed
doubt as to the propriety of punitive damages from the doctrine's

inception. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin has refused to abolish
the doctrine on more than one occasion, however, explicitly observing
that its abolition was a matter for the legislature. 2 '
Despite this conservative orientation, the recent trend in Wisconsin has been to broaden the range of culpable conduct for which an
award of punitive damages will lie.12 6 Significantly, this trend seems
to be in direct conflict with preexisting Wisconsin case law. In Bielski
v. Schulze,'2 7 the supreme court abolished the doctrine of gross negli-

gence and stated, "We recognize the abolition of gross negligence does
away with the basis for punitive damages in negligence cases."' 28 The
court questioned the deterrent effect of punitive damages with respect
to negligent conduct, noting that the availability of punitive damages
insurance also seemed to reduce the effect of the doctrine. 129 It further stated that criminal sanctions would best serve the goal of
deterrence. 130
In Kink v. Combs,' however, the supreme court stated that the
threat of criminal prosecution proved an insufficient deterrent for certain types of conduct that "almost invariably go unpunished by the
public prosecutor."' 3 2 The court explicitly refused to abolish the doctrine and reaffirmed the notion that punitive damages are a valid
123. For a detailed description and history of the doctrine in Wisconsin, see authorities
cited supra note 23.
124. Burrell & Young, supra note 3, at 32; Ghiardi & Koehn, supra note 23, at 776.
Wisconsin is one of the first jurisdictions to increase the burden of persuasion for a punitive
damages award. Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d 260, 299-300, 294 N.W.2d 437, 457
(1980). See also Tuttle v. Raymond, 494 A.2d 1353, 1363 (Me. 1985) (raising the burden in
Maine); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 549.20(1) (West 1978) (establishing "clear and convincing"
burden of persuasion for a punitive damages award).
125. Ghiardi, supra note 1, at 773 (citing Bass v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 42 Wis. 654 (1877)).
See also supra notes 1, 10 and accompanying text.
126. See Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d 260, 294 N.W.2d 437 (1980); supra note
48.
127. 16 Wis. 2d 1, 114 N.W.2d 105 (1962).
128. Bielski, 16 Wis. 2d at 18, 114 N.W.2d at 113.
129. Id. at 18 n.27, 114 N.W.2d at 113 n.27.
130. Id. at 18, 114 N.W.2d at 113-14.
131. 28 Wis. 2d 65, 135 N.W.2d 789 (1965).
132. Id. at 80, 135 N.W.2d at 798.
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means of punishment and deterrence. 33
The Bielski court purported to limit punitive damages to intentional torts by abolishing the doctrine of gross negligence. Yet, the
supreme court subsequently viewed the issue as open to interpretation
in light of Kink and commentators' analyses of that opinion.' 34 In
133. Id. at 79-80, 135 N.W.2d at 797-98.
134. Burrell & Young, supra note 3, at 32-33.
The Bielski court, in deciding that gross negligence would not bar a joint-tortfeasor from
seeking contribution from a merely negligent tortfeasor, explicitly abrogated the doctrine of
gross negligence in its entirety. The court remarked:
We recognize the abolition of gross negligence does away with the basisforpunitive
damages in negligence cases. . . . Wilful and intentional torts, of course, still
exist, but should not be confused with negligence. . . . The protection of the
public from such conduct or from reckless, wanton, or wilful conduct is best
served by the criminal laws of the state.
Bielski, 16 Wis. 2d at 18, 114 N.W.2d at 113 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Contra
Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d 260, 272-77, 294 N.W.2d 437, 444-47 (1980). Wangen
implicitly overruled Bielski to the extent that Bielski purported to limit the scope of the doctrine. Wangen, 97 Wis. 2d at 275, 294 N.W.2d at 446. Unfortunately, the Wangen court did
not rely on concrete authority. First, the court termed the above-quoted language from Bielski
"dicta." Id. at 272, 294 N.W.2d at 445. Whether that language is dicta is debatable because
the Bielski court purported to abolish the gross negligence doctrine in its entirety. Second, the
Wangen court inappropriately placed great emphasis on the language of Cieslewicz v. Mutual
Serv. Casualty Ins. Co., 84 Wis. 2d 91, 267 N.W.2d 595 (1978). In allowing insurability for
statutory multiple damages, the Cieslewicz court distinguished multiple from punitive damages
and limited its holding to the former. Id. at 101-03, 267 N.W.2d at 599-600. The Wangen
court quoted the following language from Cieslewicz:
"We note that it is an open question whether punitive damages may be
awarded in Wisconsin in the context of a negligent tort. When we abolished the
doctrine of gross negligence in Bielski v. Schulze, 16 Wis. 2d 1, 18, 114 N.W.2d
105 (1962), we used language that can be read as suggesting that punitive damages are inappropriate in negligence cases. The commentators, however, have
not read this language as precluding punitive damages in those cases. Walther &
Plein, Punitive Damages: A CriticalAnalysis:Kink v. Combs, 49 MARQ. L. REV.
369, 374 (1965); Ghiardi, supra, 60 MARQ. L. REV. at 758."

Wangen, 97 Wis. 2d at 272-73, 294 N.W.2d at 445 (quoting Cieslewicz, 84 Wis. 2d at 101 n.4,
267 N.W.2d at 600) (emphasis added). Yet, the Cieslewicz court ignored the Bielski court's
expressed intent by stating that Bielski merely suggested that punitive damages would not be

available in the negligence context. Moreover, the commentators to whom the Cieslewicz court
deferred cited no Wisconsin authority justifying this reading of Bielski. Finally, Wangen's
reliance on Kink v. Combs, 28 Wis. 2d 65, 135 N.W.2d 789 (1965), is of dubious persuasiveness. In Kink, the court spoke of the utility of the doctrine in "bringing to punishment types of
conduct that though oppressive and hurtful to the individual almost invariably go unpunished
by the public prosecutor." Kink, 28 Wis. 2d at 80, 135 N.W.2d at 798, cited in Wangen, 97
Wis. 2d at 274, 294 N.W.2d at 445. The Kink court was referring specifically to assault and
battery-an intentional tort. Kink, then, stands for the specific proposition that an intentional
or deliberate wrongdoing is of itself sufficient to support a punitive award, notwithstanding the
absence of actual malice. Kink, 28 Wis. 2d at 79, 135 N.W.2d at 797. It is unlikely that the
Kink court intended to overrule Bielski because Bielski never attempted to limit the doctrine in
the context of intentional torts and because the Kink court never cited to Bielski; therefore, the
language that the Wangen court quoted from Kink either was out of context or was mere dicta.
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Wangen v. Ford Motor Co.,13 the supreme court said that, notwithstanding Bielski, certain examples of conduct that might fall within
the former definition of "gross negligence" could merit the imposition
of punitive damages if sufficiently "outrageous."'' 36 Thus, without
expressly overruling Bielski, the Wangen court effectively lifted the
limitation to the doctrine's application which the Bielski court had
seen fit to impose, and employed instead a flexible "outrageousness"
standard. 37
1 Although Wisconsin had refused to abolish the doctrine,
it had recognized the need to limit its application. Unfortunately, it
ended up with an ambiguous, unrestricted, and subjective standard as
a limitation. This inconsistent and unrestricted treatment of the doc3
trine parallels that criticized by the courts in Lazenby and Harrell,' 1
39
and which lies at the foundation of the holding in Brown v. Maxey. 1
VII.

PUNITIVE DAMAGES INSURABILITY IN WISCONSIN

A. Analysis of Precedent
It is necessary to consider Wisconsin's treatment of the doctrine
in order to make sense of its disposition of the insurability issue. The
insurabilty of common law punitive damages was an issue of first
impression for Wisconsin's state courts;' all available authority was
purely persuasive in nature.
In reaching its decision on the public policy question in Brown,
the supreme court relied almost entirely on Harris v. County
of Racine'' and Cieslewicz v. Mutual Service Casualty Insurance
Co. "42
' The court advanced little independent reasoning and avoided
the fact that the authors of each of those opinions specifically had
43
limited its holding.
In Cieslewicz, the supreme court held that insuring against liabil144
ity for statutory multiple damages did not violate public policy.
135. 97 Wis. 2d 260, 294 N.W.2d 437 (1980).
136. Id. at 275, 294 N.W.2d at 446.

137. Id. at 266-68, 294 N.W.2d at 442.
138. The "fine-line" criticism revisited. See supra notes 8, 9, 59, 67-75 and accompanying
text.
139. See Burrell & Young, supra note 3, at 7, 32-33.
140. Brown v. Maxey, 124 Wis. 2d 426, 445, 369 N.W.2d 677, 687 (1985). Both Wangen v.
Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d 260, 287, 294 N.W.2d 437, 452 (1980), and Cieslewicz v. Mutual
Serv. Casualty Ins. Co., 84 Wis. 2d 91, 101, 267 N.W.2d 595, 600 (1978), explicitly withheld
ruling on the insurability of common law punitive damages, although Cieslewicz had allowed
insurability of statutory multiple damages.
141. 512 F. Supp. 1273 (E.D. Wis. 1981).
142. 84 Wis. 2d 91, 267 N.W.2d 595 (1978).
143. Id. at 101-03, 267 N.W.2d at 600-01; Harris, 512 F. Supp. at 1282.
144. Cieslewicz, 84 Wis. 2d. at 105, 267 N.W.2d at 602.
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The court, after acknowledging that insurance coverage might diminish the potency of the damages as a deterrent force,' 45 nonetheless
allowed insurability. It based its decision on two primary factors: the
need to protect the insured's reasonable expectations 4 6 and the existence of alternative means of punishment and deterrence. "'
Although this reasoning parallels that of several courts which
allow insurability of punitive damages, the Cieslewicz court approved
of the reasoning only with respect to multiple statutory damages. The

court persuasively distinguished multiple statutory damages from
punitive damages, in that, unlike punitive damages: 1) they require no
culpable state of mind; 2) they are given as a matter of right; and,
3) they are not tailored to the individual defendant's wealth. 4 ' These
distinguishing factors are significant. 14 9 Although the purpose of
multiple statutory damages is, to a limited extent, to punish and deter,
this is true to a much lesser degree than is the case with punitive
damages. 5 ° The "private attorney general" rationale or a compensatory rationale seem to be more realistic purposes for these damages. 5 '
Moreover, because the court asserted that the two types of damages
"must be treated separately," ' 52 it would seem that some additional
analysis was required before the Brown court could "specifically adopt
153
the reasoning employed therein to the facts in [Brown]."
145. Id. at 103, 267 N.W.2d at 601.
146. Id. at 97-99, 267 N.W.2d at 598-99; see also supra notes 76, 116-17.
147. Cieslewicz, 84 Wis. 2d at 103-04, 267 N.W.2d at 601 (arguing that possible increase in
insurance premiums, liability in excess of policy limits, and destruction of dog adequately
punish and deter owners of dogs that injure people). See supra notes 111, 112 and
accompanying text. It is significant that Cieslewicz cites Price. Cieslewicz, 84 Wis. 2d at 10304, 267 N.W.2d at 601 (citing Price v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 108 Ariz. 485, 487,
502 P.2d 522, 524 (1972)). Brown quotes and explicitly adopts this language. 124 Wis. 2d at
446-47, 369 N.W.2d at 688. It is the only reference in the Brown opinion to any case in this
line of authority. This emphasizes Brown's arguably misplaced reliance upon Cieslewicz, an
opinion which distinguished itself from Brown at length.
148. Cieslewicz, 84 Wis. 2d at 101-02, 267 N.W.2d at 600-01.
149. See supra note 45.
150. Cieslewicz, 84 Wis. 2d at 99, 103, 267 N.W.2d at 599-601; Ghiardi, supra note 1, at
775-76.
151. See, e.g., Kink v. Combs, 28 Wis. 2d 65, 80, 135 N.W.2d 789, 798 (1965). See also
supra notes 43-45 (discussing the doctrine's purposes, including the "private attorney general"
rationale). This seems logical because multiple damages are a function neither of the
defendant's wealth nor of his particular culpable state of mind; therefore, it is likely that an
award of such damages will neither "smart" the defendant, nor be commensurate with his
offense. The rationale that best survives this analysis is that such awards encourage plaintiffs
to bring valid claims.
For the argument supporting insurability of statutory damages having a compensatory
rationale, see Wojciak v. Northern Package Corp., 310 N.W.2d 675, 679-80 (Minn. 1981).
152. Cieslewicz, 84 Wis. 2d at 103, 267 N.W.2d at 601.
153. Brown, 124 Wis. 2d at 447, 369 N.W.2d at 688.
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The second case on which the Brown court relied, Harris v.
County of Racine,154 is also readily distinguishable from Brown. In
Harris,a black police officer brought a section 1983'1" action against a
Wisconsin state judge for intentionally perpetrating a vindictive racist
vendetta against the officer that culminated in the officer's discharge. 56 The United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Wisconsin held that allowing a government official to insure
against punitive damage liability arising under a section 1983 civil
rights action does not violate public policy. Writing for the court in
Harris, Chief Judge Reynolds pointed out that punitive damages
awards against government employees in civil rights cases are subject
to a competing public policy consideration' 5 7 that normally does not

inhere: holding public officials personally liable for punitive damages
awards under section 1983 might have a "chilling effect" on these
officials.' 5 8 The Harris court recognized that insurance would soften
significantly the "blow" to the defendant, but justified this by asserting that the defendant had received punishment by alternate means 59
and that competing policy considerations outweighed the need to
punish the defendant. 6 ° Further, the court stated that whereas Wisconsin courts do not impose punitive damages for compensatory purposes, in section 1983 actions, juries do tend to consider the plaintiff's
intangible injuries in assessing punitive damages awards. Thus, even
though the award is supposed to bear a reasonable relation to the
defendant's wealth, in civil rights actions punitive damages awards

may have a "devastating financial effect on particular individuals."''
154. 512 F. Supp. 1273 (E.D. Wis. 1981).
155. Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
156. Harris, 512 F. Supp. at 1275.
157. Id. at 1284.
158. Id. at 1282. The classic "chilling effect" argument proposes that the public benefits
from the ability of civil servants to act freely in the public's interest. If civil servants fear the
uninsurable consequences of their acts, the argument continues, they "may choose not to act
rather than to act in a matter potentially controversial." Id. This would impede seriously the
effectiveness of civil servants. Id. at 1283.
159. Id. at 1282; see supra note 148 and accompanying text.
160. Harris, 512 F. Supp. at 1282. The court is really arguing that competing public
policies militate against punishing and deterring the particular conduct under scrutiny to the
extent of an unbridled punitive damages award. If such were the case, it would be more logical
not to impose an award in the first place. A final award should signify that the court has
weighed the policies and that the jury has fashioned an appropriate award to punish and deter
the conduct in question. To sustain an award, the conduct must demonstrate a sufficiently
culpable state of mind on the part of the defendant; an anti-coverage result need not "chill"
civil servants because if they are acting in good faith, ideally, they have nothing to fear. Cf.
Soderbeck v. Burnett County, 752 F.2d 285, 291 (7th Cir. 1985) (upholding the trial court's
decision not to submit the punitive damages question to the jury in a § 1983 action because the
defendant had had no knowledge that his actions were impinging upon the plaintiffs rights).
161. Cieslewicz, 84 Wis. 2d at 104, 267 N.W.2d at 601, cited in Harris, 512 F. Supp. at 1283,
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Without considering the validity of these arguments, the fact remains
that the Harris court specifically tailored these arguments to remedy
the "occupational hazard" 162 that civil rights litigation presents to
public officials. The motivating concern underlying the Harrisopinion is irrelevant under the facts of Brown; Harris presents a weak
analogy at best.
B.

Brown v. Maxey

Unlike the insurability decisions of most other jurisdictions,
Brown was neither a drunk-driving case nor a section 1983 civil rights
action. The case involved a suit by J.T. Brown, an injured tenant of a
low-income housing project, against Maxey, the sole owner of the
163
project, and State Farm Fire and Casualty Co., Maxey's insurer.
Maxey's culpable conduct consisted of failing to provide security
measures for his tenants, despite his knowledge of recurring incidents
of breaking and entering, vandalism, and arson; Maxey's indifference
afforded vandals and arsonists free access to the complex. One such
arsonist set a fire just outside of Brown's door, severely burning him.
Brown sued Maxey and State Farm in negligence for compensatory
damages, and further demanded punitive damages, claiming that
Brown's conduct reached the level of "outrageous" conduct t 64 and
thus merited a punitive award under Wisconsin law.1 65 At trial, findand Brown, 124 Wis. 2d at 446, 369 N.W.2d at 688. The Cieslewicz court prefaced its
recitation of the equitable considerations generally favoring insurance by referring to the
potentially devastating financial effects of a multiple damages award. Because the rationales
underlying multiple damage awards differ from those underlying punitive awards, it is more
important that the plaintiff receive the award than that the defendant actually be the one to pay
it. See supra note 151. As Brown and Harris both involve common law punitive damage
awards, it is arguably more important that the defendant pay than that the plaintiff receive.
See Northwestern Nat'l Casualty Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432, 438 (5th Cir. 1962).
Therefore, these courts are citing language which may be inapposite. The "risk-spreading"
and insurance arguments, though valid tort-objectives with respect to achieving full
compensation for a nonculpable victim, become irrelevant and even counter-intuitive once
compensation has been achieved and the purpose of the award becomes punishment. See id. at
438-40. After all, society may desire that a punitive award have a devastating financial impact
on certain individuals; punishment was never meant to be fun.
162. Harris, 512 F. Supp. at 1284. In Harris, a court was faced with the tasks of examining
the conduct of a judicial colleague and of deciding whether society's interest in having the
judge pay his own punitive damages award outweighed the interest in having public employees
be able to perform free from the ominous "chilling effect." It is surprising that in view of the
particularly egregious conduct under scrutiny, the court held as it did. If the Harris court
feared the chilling effect, even in the context of the defendant's conduct in this case, then it
seems that the court decided that civil servants should never be chilled; the court effectively
created judicial immunity from punitive damages awards under section 1983.
163. Brown v. Maxey, 124 Wis. 2d 426, 429, 369 N.W.2d 677, 679-80 (1985).
164. Id. at 430, 369 N.W.2d at 680.
165. Id.
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ing Brown's argument persuasive, the jury awarded him $52,185 in
compensatory damages and $200,000 in punitive damages.' 66
The court of appeals affirmed the compensatory damages award,
but reversed the punitive damages award, concluding that "punitive
damages are not recoverable in a case of negligence." 1 6 7 On review,
the Supreme Court of Wisconsin reversed the appellate court, holding
that punitive damages are available for outrageous conduct, irrespective of the classification of the underlying tort. 6 ' The supreme court
further held that it would consider an insurer who fails to unambiguously exclude punitive damages coverage from a liability policy to
have extended such coverage. 169 The court also upheld the punitive
award as not excessive, although Brown had not submitted evidence
of Maxey's net worth. 170 Finally, the court asserted that insurability
is compatible with public policy. 17'
It is significant that five years after the Supreme Court of Wisconsin decided Wangen v. FordMotor Co.,' 72 the Wisconsin appellate

court in Brown, relying on that opinion, still could conclude that
"punitive damages are not recoverable in a case of negligence."'' 73
The Wangen court reasoned that the availability of punitive damages
rests "not on the classification of the underlying tort justifying com174
pensatory damages, but on the nature of the wrongdoer's conduct."'
This, however, was not consistent with prior Wisconsin opinions that
had attempted to place limitations on the availability of punitive damages. Instead, Wangen made punitive damages available in any tort
action upon a showing that the defendant's conduct was "outrageous."' 75 The appellate court in Brown apparently either misunderstood or rejected such an expansive application of the doctrine. As a
result, the supreme court majority in Brown found it necessary to
76
restate and reaffirm the holding of the Wangen court.

166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 429, 369 N.W.2d at 679.
169. Id. at 441-43, 369 N.W.2d at 685-86.
170. Id. at 439-40, 369 N.W.2d at 684-85.
171. Id. at 444-45, 369 N.W.2d at 686-88.
172. 97 Wis. 2d 260, 294 N.W.2d 437 (1980).
173. 124 Wis. 2d at 430-31, 369 N.W.2d at 680.
174. Id. (citing Wangen, 97 Wis. 2d at 266, 294 N.W.2d at 442).
175. 124 Wis. 2d at 431 & n.I, 369 N.W.2d at 680 & n.1; Wangen, 97 Wis. 2d at 260, 298,
299 N.W.2d at 442, 457. See supra notes 66, 139 and accompanying text.
176. The appellate court candidly stated:
We believe that . . . [the supreme court's opinion in Wangen] may be sending
mixed messages to the trial bench ....
Therefore, it is conceivable that a trial
court could interpret Wangen as meaning that punitive damages are recoverable
anytime aggravating circumstances are present. Based on the history of punitive
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The Brown court reasserted that the purpose of punitive damages
in Wisconsin is to punish and deter conduct of two "distinct" types: 7 7
1) that by which the wrongdoer desires to cause harm, or which he
knows is "substantially certain" to result in harm; and, 2) that which
the wrongdoer "knows, or should have reason to know" 178 involves a
"strong probability" of harm. The court found that because Maxey's
conduct was of the latter type, the appellate court had erred in setting
179
aside the punitive damages award.
Having found that an award of punitive damages was proper, the
court next refused to overturn the amount despite its magnitude and
despite the fact that Brown had introduced no evidence of Maxey's
wealth for an award determination.1 0 The court agreed that the
amount was substantial, but contended that as "smart money," the
amount was supposed to hurt. The court refused to alter the $200,000
award, finding that it did not "shock the conscience," but rather, that
a jury could have found such an amount to be an appropriate measure
of punishment and deterrence commensurate with Maxey's misconduct.' 8 ' The court dismissed the defendant's contention that the
damages, this interpretation would be unreasonably broad. We believe the better
course is to view punitive damages within their historical context, that is
recoverable only in a few well-defined instances.
If, as a matter of policy, enlargement of the punitive damages rule is thought to
be necessary, such a decision is solely within the sphere of the supreme court.
Brown v. Maxey, No. 83-2325, slip op. at 21-23 (Wis. Ct. App. Oct. 25, 1984), rev'd, 124 Wis.
2d 426, 369 N.W.2d 677 (1985). Cf. supra notes 37-66, 138-39 and accompanying text (the
"fine-line" criticisms). The court of appeals may have been concerned that Wangen and the
trial court's opinion in Brown conveniently reduced or "abbreviated" the standard of conduct
to "outrageous." See supra note 175. The more liberal reading of Wangen appeared to grant
juries sweeping power to award punitive damages in practically any tort case because "outrageous" is for the jury to determine. See supra notes 67-73 and accompanying text. The appellate court phrased its holding in such a way as to force the supreme court to take a definitive
position as to the availability of punitive damages: either to "reinstate" the Bielski limitations,
or to reaffirm its apparent position in Wangen, that is, one of unrestricted availability.
177. 124 Wis. 2d at 433, 369 N.W.2d at 681-82. Yet for all the subtle terminology, the
court nonetheless found it convenient to "use the term 'outrageous'... as an abbreviation for
the type of conduct justifying the impostion of punitive damages." Id. at 431 n. 1, 369 N.W.2d
at 680 n. 1. See supra notes 32-36 and accompanying text.
178. 124 Wis. 2d at 433, 369 N.W.2d at 681. Traditionally, the lower level of culpability
justifying a punitive damages award "hovers" around recklessness. The language "should have
reason to know" misstates the definition of recklessness. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 500 (1965); see supra notes 55-56. By combining the "should know" and "has reason to
know" states of mind, the author of this language implied that punitive damages may be
appropriate for an act which is only sufficiently unreasonable to constitute negligence, but not
recklessness.
179. 124 Wis. 2d at 437-38, 369 N.W.2d at 682-83. But see id. at 447-52, 369 N.W.2d at
688-91 (Steinmetz, J., dissenting).
180. Id. at 437-39, 369 N.W.2d at 683-84.
181. Id. at 438-40, 369 N.W.2d at 684-85.
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amount was defective in the absence of evidence of the defendant's
wealth. Citing Fahrenbergv. Tengel,'82 the court stated that although
the defendant's wealth is one of several factors which a jury may consider in determining an award, this is not a prerequisite for a punitive
award.I83 This directly contradicted Cieslewicz v. Mutual Service Casualty Insurance Co., cited frequently in Fahrenbergand Brown, which
stated that a jury must consider the defendant's wealth in determining
the size of an award. 18 4 It seems strange that the majority would
uphold the award without considering the defendant's wealth; after
all, "what would be 'smart money' to a poor man would not be, and
would not serve as a deterrent, to a rich man."' 85 Actually, by holding Maxey's insurer liable for the punitive damages award regardless
of the amount, the court effectively made Maxey's wealth
irrelevant. 86
The Brown court next ventured into the field of contract construction: by applying the standard principles of insurance policy
construction, the court concluded that Maxey's State Farm insurance
87
policy did in fact extend coverage for punitive damages liability.
Yet, in construing the policy language by which State Farm agreed to
pay "all sums which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay
as damages because of: A. Bodily injury..

,."I88
the

court even went

so far as to hold that there was no ambiguity-that this language
clearly contemplated punitive damages coverage. 89 It is curious that
after devoting the first half of its opinion to the proposition that punitive damages are awarded because of the nature of the wrongdoer's
conduct, the majority then turned around and stated that punitive
damages clearly are awarded "because of bodily injury." That a significant number of jurisdictions have found the same or similar lan182. 96 Wis. 2d 211, 291 N.W.2d 516 (1980).
183. 124 Wis. 2d at 439, 369 N.W.2d at 684.
184. Cieslewicz, 84 Wis. 2d at 102, 267 N.W.2d at 600-01; Hartland Cicero Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Elmer, 122 Wis. 2d 481, 485, 363 N.W.2d 252, 254 (Ct. App. 1984); supra note 112; cf. 124
Wis. 2d at 452, 369 N.W.2d at 690-91 (Steinmetz, J., dissenting) (Tailoring the award to a
defendant's wealth is critical.).
185. Suzore v. Rutherford, 35 Tenn. App. 678, 684, 251 S.W.2d 129, 131 (1952).
186. This is inconsistent with the court's previous finding that the award did provide an
appropriate quantum of punishment and deterrence. See supra note 181.
187. 124 Wis. 2d at 441-43, 369 N.W.2d at 685-86; see supra notes 76, 80, 84, 90, 116. But

see Burrell & Young, supra note 3, at 10-11 (discussing the decision of the Insurance Services
Office not to provide explicit punitive damages exclusions, apparently believing such action

unnecessary). The insurance industry, however, had received ample warning in Cieslewicz.
See Brown, 124 Wis. 2d at 451, 369 N.W.2d at 690 (Steinmetz, J., dissenting).

188. 124 Wis. 2d at 442, 369 N.W.2d at 685.
189. Id. at 442-434, 124 Wis. 2d at 686.
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guage did not extend coverage to punitive damages liability 90 would
seem to indicate that coverage was ambiguous at best.
Having concluded that Maxey's policy contemplated punitive
damages coverage, the court treated the public policy question as the
final inquiry.'
The court dealt with the public policy issue by first
citing Harrisv. County of Racine for a synopsis of the viewpoints of
both sides of the insurability split. 9 2 The court then disposed of the
issue by specifically adopting the reasoning of the Cieslewicz court. 93
The first argument that the court adopted from Cielsewicz was
that there exists more than one public policy, one of which specifically
favors the freedom to contract.' 94 This argument sidesteps the real
question: should the public be free to enter such contracts in the first
place."'9 5 Certainly, in discussing whether to void a policy insuring an
individual against criminal fines, a court would be unlikely to invoke
such an argument.' 9 6
The second argument that the court adopted from Cieslewicz is
that, even if insurability does dilute the doctrine's force, there still
exist alternate sources of punishment and deterrence, such as
increased insurance rates and the possibility that the award will
exceed the limits of liability under the policy.' 97 This argument
proves very weak under analysis. First, as indicated earlier,' 9 8 multiple damages are not designed to impose the same element of punishment and deterrence as are punitive damages; therefore, adopting the
"alternate source" argument of the Cieslewicz court is unpersuasive.
Second, after asserting at length that the punitive damages award of
$200,000 against Maxey was appropriate in light of Maxey's conduct,
it defies reason that the court would subsequently state that the possibility of higher future insurance premiums would have an equivalent
effect.' 99 Insurability neutralizes the flexible punch of punitive dam190. See, e.g., cases cited in Annot., 16 A.L.R. 4th 11, 36-38 (1982). But see cases cited id.
at 32-36.
191. 124 Wis. 2d at 444-47, 369 N.W.2d at 686-88. If the court had been predisposed
against insurability, it might have approached the public policy question at the onset, as did
the court in Northwestern Nat'l Casualty Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432, 434 (5th Cir. 1962).
See supra note 90.
192. 124 Wis. 2d at 444-45, 369 N.W.2d at 687 (citing Harris, 512 F. Supp. at 1280-81).
193. Id. at 447, 369 N.W.2d at 688.
194. Id. at 446-47, 369 N.W.2d at 687-88 (citing Cieslewicz, 84 Wis. 2d at 103, 267 N.W.2d

at 601).
195. See supra notes 76, 80, 84, 90, 116.
196. See supra notes 80, 117 and accompanying text.
197. 124 Wis. 2d 446-47, 369 N.W.2d at 688 (citing Cieslewicz, 84 Wis. 2d at 103-04, 267
N.W.2d at 601).
198. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
199. But see 124 Wis. 2d at 452, 369 N.W.2d at 690-91 (Steinmetz, J., dissenting). Justice
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ages and allows a potential tortfeasor the opportunity to make a cost/
benefit analysis of culpable conduct to determine whether such conduct will be "worthwhile." Essentially, if a landlord such as Maxey
finds it more profitable to risk higher premiums than to spend
increased sums on maintenance and security, he will do so. The
majority's holding makes this a practical and financially reasonable
course of action. 2" If punitive damages indeed punish and deter, it is
because they are of a magnitude that hurts the wrongdoer to a degree
to which he never would have chosen to subject himself.2"'
The "alternate source" argument also fails because an award
consisting solely of compensatory damages would have exactly the
same effect: increased premiums, possible awards in excess of policy
limits, and social stigma. Punitive damages are appropriate where the
element of punishment and deterrence inherent in an award of compensatory damages would be insufficient for the conduct involved.2 °2
Thus, if the alternate sources proposed by the Cieslewicz court and
adopted by the Brown court are sufficient, there is no reason to impose
punitive damages in the first place. The majority failed to respond
adequately to the proposition that insurance neutralizes the effect of a
punitive damages award with respect to the actual wrongdoer. The
net result is that a court will allow civil sanctions against a tortfeasor
under the guise of punishment and deterrence, while not requiring
that tortfeasor to pay.20 3
Steinmetz contended that the court had accepted the principle that "money talks," and that it

is "direct financial liability" for a punitive damage award which affects the doctrine's purposes.
Id.
200. See also Reynolds v. Pegler, 123 F. Supp. 36, 41-42 (S.D.N.Y. 1954), af'd, 223 F.2d
429 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 846 (1955) (proposing that if net worth is not considered in
determining the amount of an award, this may even result in encouraging malfeasance); State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Daughdrill, 474 So. 2d 1048, 1052 (Miss. 1985) (asserting that a

jury must consider the defendant's wealth in awarding punitive damages).
201. Doralee Estates, Inc. v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 569 F.2d 716, 723 (2d Cir. 1977)
("Exemplary damages are intended to inject an additional factor into the cost-benefit
calculations of companies who might otherwise find it fiscally prudent to disregard the threat
of liability. To function effectively, the award must be 'of sufficient substance to 'smart' . . . the
offender.' ") (quoting from Reynolds v. Pegler, 123 F. Supp. 36, 41-42 (S.D.N.Y. 1954), affid,
223 F.2d 429 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 846 (1955)); Tuttle v. Raymond, 494 A.2d 1353,
1359 (Me. 1985) ("Flexibility [of punitive damage award amounts] is also necessary to avoid

situations where the potential benefits of wrongdoing could outweigh a known maximum
liability."); supra notes 112, 185 and accompanying text. The Brown majority decision simply
does not address these considerations. Brown, 124 Wis. 2d at 451, 369 N.W.2d at 690

(Steinmetz, J., dissenting) (The majority has given "license to* violent, conscious, wanton,
outrageous behavior as long as you can afford to pay for it in advance.").
202. Northwestern Nat'l Casualty Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432, 435.36 (5th Cir. 1962)
(citing cases therein).
203. Harrell v. Travelers Indem. Co., 279 Or. 199, 220, 567 P.2d 1013, 1026 (1977)
(Holman, J., dissenting).
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CONCLUSION

It is fundamental logic that if the punitive damages doctrine
indeed punishes and deters undesirable conduct, then insurability robs
society of this benefit. For this reason, pro-coverage courts necessarily justify their decisions, not by advocating insurability directly, but
rather, by impugning the doctrine itself. Pro-coverage decisions often
betray a pronounced anti-doctrine orientation. There is little logic in
a court retaining a doctrine that it deems either of no value, or more
harmful than helpful. The most logical solution would appear to be
judicial abolition or limitation of the doctrine.
Yet, although the doctrine was born under a judge's pen, judges
hesitate to erase their own creation for fear of impinging upon subsequently exercised legislative prerogative. No court yet has generated
enough internal fervor to take this bold step. Because legislatures do
not exercise their prerogative to the satisfaction of some judiciaries,
many courts resort to insurability as a surreptitious way of rendering
the doctrine impotent.
Moreover, even judges that approve of the doctrine in principle,
may balk at its inherent potential for unfair application. However a
court may attempt to avoid this overbreadth by the linguistic manipulation of standards, culpability always will be an elusive inquiry
because a juror's only guideline is, ultimately, his own subjective conscience. Overbreadth is an unavoidable cost of the doctrine; ideal
application is an unrealistic demand.
One factor upon which pro-coverage courts often focus is ambiguous insurance policy drafting by insurers. Judicial distaste for this
practice often fuels the pro-coverage trend and eclipses effective discussion of the public policy implications of insurability itself. This
misplaced focus distorts the issue. It is illogical to contend that conduct may be culpable enough to merit a punitive award, but not so
culpable as to merit a denial of insurance protection. It must be
assumed that a jury award of punitive damages serves public policy.
Thus, even if the policy under scrutiny explicitly offered punitive
damages liability coverage, insurability would contravene public policy; the insurer's drafting, however misleading, is not germane to the
inquiry. However irrelevent, pro-coverage courts profit from this
contractual analysis to bolster their indirect assault on the doctrine.
In Brown, the issues on appeal forced the Supreme Court of Wisconsin to establish a definitive punitive damages standard. The first
option was to impose a strict limitation on conduct for which punitive
awards would be appropriate. The second option was to read Wangen
liberally so as to allow punitive damages awards for any conduct of
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sufficient culpability. The court selected the latter open-ended standard, thereby exposing a broad range of conduct to civil punishment
and deterrence. Paradoxically, despite ample authority that consideration of a defendant's wealth is crucial to assess an award that will
impart a sufficient measure of punishment and deterrence, the court
held to the contrary. 2° In so ruling, the Brown court evinced either
an outright skepticism toward the doctrine's punitive and deterrent
efficacy, or a recognition that its auxilliary pro-coverage holding
would neutralize the doctrine's force, and thus render such a consideration superfluous.
It is indisputable that a resourceful individual may now make a
cost/benefit analysis and place himself above the Wisconsin law of
punitive damages. Whatever the rationale, the Brown court effectively
affirmed the value of the doctrine and then emasculated it within the
span of eleven pages.
Although at first glance this jurisprudence may appear weak, it
may have the effect of forcing the legislature's hand. In 1984, the
Supreme Court of Montana held in favor of insurability.2 °5 Within the
year, the Montana legislature created a statutory cap to punitive damages awards, limiting such awards to the greater of $25,000 or one
percent of the defendant's net worth.2" 6 Although insurance lobbyists
may have influenced the passage of this legislation; it is also possible,
however, that the Montana legislature disapproved of these pro-coverage decisions and promulgated this statute, at least in part, to persuade the court to decide differently should it have the opportunity to
reconsider the insurability question. Although the statutory cap
should significantly soothe judicial concerns as to the doctrine's unfair
overbreadth, it will have a side effect analagous to that of disregarding
the defendant's wealth.
It will frustrate the jury's discretion to tailor an award to punish
the defendant in an appropriate measure, and thereby reduce the doctrine's efficacy as a source of civil punishment and deterrence. It
appears that, while both insurability and statutory caps soften the
doctrine's overbreadth, both dilute the doctrine's force as well. There
is no escaping this trade-off. Perhaps pro-coverage courts recognize
that they cannot retain the doctrine's benefits while simultaneously
eliminating its burdens. Assuming that they would prefer to rid
themselves of the burdens even at the cost of foregoing the benefits,
they very well may perceive insurability as the only judicial means of
204. See supra notes 181-87 and accompanying text.
205. See supra note 85.
206. See supra note 1.
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wrenching control of the doctrine from unresponsive legislatures.
Whatever the rationale, pro-coverage courts have purported to defer
to legislative prerogative, while welcoming insurability as a back door
into that branch's realm. In essence, pro-coverage courts effectively

have managed to do what critical jurists have wanted to do for over a
century: abolish the doctrine of punitive damages.2 °7
GARY

S.

FRANKLIN*

207. See supra note II and accompanying text.
* I dedicate this comment to all the good folks in my life, and thank Kevin Dorse in
particular for his insight, effort, and spring break. Some break!

